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

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

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JUNE 8, 1998

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

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CORRESPONDENCE

Global thinking

To the editors:
Discussions of global warming in the press have been dominated by ideologues of the right and left talking past each other, encouraged by irresponsible editorial decisions at usually reputable publications. By clearly recognizing uncertainties in predictions and identifying several cost-effective moves, Gregg Easterbrook ("Hot and Not Bothered," May 4) brings a refreshing objectivity to an important debate. Let's hope such clear thinking does not get lost in a sea of blather.

ROBERT IRWIN
Monument, Colorado

To the editors:
In Gregg Easterbrook's insouciant piece about global warming (the one with the graphic of the world sipping a cool drink and enjoying the heat from the sun), he quotes me as pointing out that we used to worry about the chance that atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide would double and that now "doubling is an optimistic scenario because buildup may not stop there." Indeed that's what I wrote—but I wrote it mournfully. Our failure to take global warming seriously for the past decade (a failure abetted in some tiny part by Easterbrook's cheerfulness on the topic in his book *A Moment on Earth*) does indeed mean it will be extremely hard to stop the buildup of greenhouse gases short of a doubling. But not impossible—not if we make reducing our emissions a top national priority and if we make bringing other nations on board a top foreign policy goal. (Higher, say, than protecting copyright for video games.) Picturing the earth reclining on a chaise longue in sun-warmed bliss may seem droll now, but I suspect it's an image that will come back someday to trouble you.

BILL MCKIBBEN
Via the Internet

To the editors:
Gregg Easterbrook misses a critical distinction by lumping geoengineering (physical techniques to counter global warming) with adaptation. While both avoid the hard, expensive choices that cutting back on our emissions requires, adaptation only saves selected resources; geoengineering can save the planet.

JAY MICHAELSON
Jerusalem, Israel

Mahler on trial

To the editors:
As Dr. Norman Finkelstein's older brothers, we are outraged at Jonathan Mahler's patently false insinuations that anyone in our small decimated family is a Holocaust denier ("Cooked Book," May 4). If he had bothered to read even the dedication page, Mahler would have seen that the book, *A Nation on Trial*, is dedicated to our parents, who survived the horrors of the Warsaw Ghetto and numerous work and concentration camps. We know that the Holocaust existed more than most do. Mahler should be ashamed of himself. Our family has suffered enough.

HENRY AND RICHARD FINKELSTEIN
Chicago, Illinois

JANE AUSTEN RULES—RICHARD JENKYNS
THE NEW REPUBLIC
Beating the Heat
It's too late to stop global warming. But we can still learn to live with it.
By Gregg Easterbrook
SPF 20

To the editors:
Jonathan Mahler's piece on *A Nation on Trial* doesn't do justice to the stunningly fatuous nature of the criticisms of Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's *Hitler's Willing Executioners* found therein. I'd like to serve up just one example.

Goldhagen describes the death march from the Helmbrechts women's camp in the last days of the war when the Allied victory was obviously no more than weeks away. Roughly equal numbers of Jewish and non-Jewish women were forced to set out on the march. The non-Jews were provided with some additional clothing and rations; the Jews, already more ragged and more emaciated, with nothing. After about 40 miles of what would become a 195-mile march, it halted, and the non-Jews, with the exception of a couple dozen German women, were left behind in another prison camp, presumably to recuperate and await the arrival of Allied troops. As best anyone can tell, the march resulted in the deaths of between 200 and 300 Jewish women and not a single non-Jewish woman.

In her contribution to *A Nation on Trial*, Ruth Bettina Birn writes that a comparison of "the first part of the death march (mixed prisoners) with the second part (almost exclusively Jewish prisoners) ... reveals no fundamental difference in the behavior of the guards," contradicting Goldhagen's conclusion that the "Helmbrechts march turned out to be a *death* march for Jews and only for Jews." Somehow Birn fails to recognize the qualitative difference between participating in approximately one-fifth of a forced march and participating in the subsequent four-fifths; perhaps she should attempt a 195-mile hike herself for clearer comprehension.

CHARLES R.L. POWER
Columbia, Maryland

Standing tall

To the editors:
It is inaccurate and absurd for Ryan Lizza to identify the proposed Headwaters Forest purchase and preservation as "the most prominent example of an age-old, but increasingly common, method of undermining land-use regulations: threatening to defile land unless the government buys it" ("Gold Diggers," May 4).

MAXXAM did not acquire Pacific Lumber with any notion of "threatening to defile." MAXXAM bought Pacific Lumber more than twelve years ago because of the quality of its timberlands and the capability of its management. It since has reinvested well in excess of $100 million in Pacific Lumber. Long before the acquisition, all of Pacific Lumber's land was zoned by California exclusively for the commercial production and regrowth of timber. That continues to be true today.

Pacific Lumber, both before and after being acquired by MAXXAM, planned at some point to harvest in Headwaters. However, responsive to public sentiment to preserve Headwaters and after lengthy negotiations with the U.S. and California governments, MAXXAM and Pacific Lumber entered into an agreement in September 1996 to sell Headwaters Forest, another old-growth forest, and protective buffer zones to the government at a price that represents a substantial discount below the full market value.

MAXXAM and Pacific Lumber agreed to major concessions in order to bring about both the initial 1996 Head-

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waters Agreement and a more recent, February 1998 agreement in principle on a long-range habitat conservation plan and sustained-yield plan for all of its acreage. The result will be a "win" for all concerned: Ancient redwood and Douglas fir trees will be saved, wildlife habitat will be protected, good-paying jobs will be preserved, forest products will continue to be available to consumers, a hard-pressed local economy will be strengthened, the company will be justly compensated, its shareholders' interests will be served, and—over the howls of some few but vocal extremists—a decade-long controversy will be successfully resolved.

JOHN A. CAMPBELL
President and Chief Executive Officer
The Pacific Lumber Company
Scotia, California

History lesson

To the editors:

After publishing Arthur Koestler's letter of resignation from the German Communist Party and Michael Scammell's valuable commentary on it—particularly on how he came to find the document and on the purges and Soviet show trials that so distressed Koestler as well as on the fate of Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* ("Arthur Koestler Resigns," May 4)—TNR might go still further toward meeting the need of historical justice by letting its readers know that the magazine (it was once a very different magazine) supported the purges and trashed Koestler's novel when it came out in 1941.

JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS
New York City

Pain without gain

To the editors:

Peter H. Schuck rails against "pain and suffering" awards given to those injured under traditional insurance—awards which would be eliminated under no-fault insurance ("No Fault, No Foul," May 4). In the real world, this is what no-fault means: If a reckless driver hits your car, kills your baby, cripples you for life, and leaves you unable to have another child, you would never be able to hold the driver who is in the wrong, or his insurance company, fully responsible. Ultimately, under no-fault, the most you can expect—and you may have to sue your own insurance company to get it—are your medical expenses, lost wages, and funeral costs. Whatever the industry calls it, no-fault is simply a "Reckless Driver Protection Plan."

CARLTON CARL
Washington, D.C.

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

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FROM WASHINGTON

Power to the party

Remember the Lambert resolution, which five months ago ruined a GOP pow-wow in Palm Springs by calling for the party to stop funding candidates who support partial-birth abortion? Well, it's back. Having lost nationally, the Christian right is peddling Lambert to the states. So far, the Republican parties of Alaska, Georgia, Nebraska, and South Carolina have signed on. Alabama, California, and Texas will likely follow.

Coming on the heels of a threat by Christian conservative leader James Dobson to bolt the party, the renewed skirmish over partial-birth abortion seems to fit a familiar story line: GOP ideological bloodletting. But it's not ideology that makes the Lambert resolution interesting—it's process. Christian conservatives have been trying to get Republican politicians to emphasize social issues forever; Lambert signals a change in how they're doing it. In the past few years, the religious right has gained control of most of the state Republican parties in the South and West. Its influence over party committees today far exceeds its influence over candidates. And so Christian conservatives now have an interest in overturning a decades-old axiom of American politics: Candidates control parties rather than the other way around. If they succeed, they will change more than just the way Republicans handle abortion; they will change the way Republicans practice democracy.



For most of American history, party leaders wielded much more power than they do today. Up through the 1960s, candidates relied on party organizations to mobilize voters. National convention delegates were chosen in opaque caucuses and generally owed their allegiance not to a presidential candidate but to the party boss who selected them.

All that changed in the 1970s. One reason was television, which allowed candidates to reach voters without the help of party machines. Rule reforms were another. In 1970, the Democrats began pressuring states to hold presidential primaries with delegates clearly pledged to a particular candidate, and the Republicans eventually followed suit. In 1968, only 36 percent of Republican National Convention delegates were chosen in primaries and were committed to a particular candidate. By 1980, that figure had climbed to 69 percent. Today, the parties have little say over who gets nominated, how they run their campaigns, and what they do in office.

As long as the newly empowered primary voters resembled the people who ran the parties, this shift didn't cause much controversy. But, when the Christian Coalition developed a grassroots network in the early 1990s, it found itself much better able to control party committees than to win primaries. That's because party offices were still chosen the old way—through a process that began with precinct conventions. A handful of dedicated people could control a precinct convention—provided they were willing to sit through hours of parliamentary procedure—even if their numbers were too small to sway a primary. By 1994, according to *Campaigns & Elections* magazine, the religious right dominated 18 state Republican parties and substantially influenced another 13.

Today, as a result, many state parties are split both ideologically and institutionally: between candidates and consultants who take their cues from a broad, relatively nonideological primary electorate and party officials who answer to the activists who control the precinct conventions. And so the Christian right's struggle to moralize the GOP has become a struggle to reassert party authority as well.

In Minnesota in 1994, a state convention dominated by members of the Christian Coalition refused to endorse Republican Governor Arne Carlson for reelection and backed an obscure conservative activist instead. Carlson won the primary nonetheless. That prompted party officials to suggest changes in state rules that would make it harder to run against the candidate the convention endorses—essentially, to return to the days of party control. In Texas two years ago, party activists rejected the Dole campaign's proposed delegates to the national convention—even though Dole had won the Texas primary. They chose their own slate instead, most of whom pledged to oppose a pro-choice vice-

continued on page 45

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

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THE NEW REPUBLIC

JUNE 8, 1998

LIVING DANGEROUSLY

It's been noted that, in times of revolution, men live fast. Indonesia is living fast right now, so fast, in fact, that no one can predict with confidence who, if anyone, will rule the vast archipelago in the weeks and months to come. What is clear is that neither the government of President Suharto (who has resigned under massive popular pressure as this issue of TNR is going to press) nor the government of the United States was prepared for this moment, even though everything we know about economic and political modernization—not to mention the last 30 years of East Asian history—should have warned us that it was coming.

United States policymakers did not prepare for this day because they were focused on stability. And, in a country of Indonesia's size, diversity, and discontents, stability is not a minor concern. But the irony of our policy of elevating stability over reform is the same irony that always attends such a policy: Over time, the lack of reform is itself destabilizing. Today, as Suharto departs, Indonesia is a country thoroughly unprepared for his departure. Its opposition is divided and immature; its parliament consists of Suharto clients unschooled in democratic behavior; its mobs that rage against the government are easily diverted into rage against Indonesia's ethnic minorities. Most of all, the opposition possesses no single figure with the moral authority to harness the explosive social and political forces that are coming to the fore, much less to channel them into a peaceful, lawful transition.

Most of this has little to do with U.S. policy, not even with the overly cozy relationship that the Clinton White House maintained with some of Indonesia's most powerful plutocrats. But by steadfastly refusing, even up through last week, to make political reform a high priority of its relationship with Indonesia, the United States bears some responsibility nonetheless. Oh, there were reasons to buttress a corrupt, authoritarian system, as there always are. During the cold war, Indonesia was a bulwark of East Asian anti-communism; more recently, it has been a counterweight to China and a tempting market for U.S. trade and investment. The country's unity was fragile and it needed a strong hand to keep it intact. Its pride was easily wounded, and any foreign meddling would spark a nationalist backlash. When the Indonesian economy was booming, we lacked the self-confidence to criticize the Indonesian autocracy because it was (seemingly) putting rice on the table. When the economy turned bad, we didn't criticize because the country might fall into chaos. And so we didn't, and now it has.

Even today, some say Indonesia's woes come not from too little meddling but from too much—in particular, from the International Monetary Fund. It was the IMF's demands for an end to food and gas subsidies, the argument goes, that brought protesters into the streets.

The argument is an important one. But it can too easily divert blame from countless Third World autocrats, becoming a rationale for empty left-wing populism on the one hand or for leaving tyrants to manage their domains on the other. But there's a reason why the students in the streets of Jakarta are burning Suharto in effigy, not Michel Camdessus. The IMF did not ask the Indonesian government to end subsidies to the poor. It asked the Indonesian government to begin dismantling a corrupt system of wildly inefficient state interventions in the market that had brought the country to the brink of financial collapse. And it suggested that Suharto start with the subsidies at the top—those that fed his fat and sycophantic extended family.

In South Korea, the IMF preached the same message, and a democratic government responded with a program of shared sacrifice. The political elite lined up to sell their jewelry so that banks could sell the gold to boost foreign reserves. Today, there are no riots in the streets of Seoul, and the country is on the way back to economic health. Suharto, by contrast, did what autocrats usually do when presented with demands for capitalist reform—they dish out painful free-market discipline to the poor and preserve anti-market state protection for the rich. And then Western intellectuals say the problem is not despotic government but capitalism.

If the IMF can be criticized, it is for not pressuring

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Indonesia to open its economy earlier—far earlier. Currency crises stem from insufficient information, and public ignorance allows governments to pretend their economies are stronger than they are, which causes the market to overvalue their currency—and ultimately leads to a crash when the truth comes out. Had the IMF demanded that Suharto open his economy to public inspection years ago, Indonesia's currency would never have become so overinflated.

Suharto did not attempt economic reform on his own because the president knew that, if anyone peered into government accounting books, he would find vast corruption there. And that is where the IMF's failure to insist upon economic openness dovetailed with America's failure to push for political openness. A freer press and a legitimate parliamentary opposition would also have helped smoke out the truth about Indonesian crony capitalism. And that, too, would have helped prevent the current crisis.

At this point in the history of the Suharto regime, the lesson may be largely academic. But it is worth learning—or, rather, relearning—because there are other Suhartos sitting atop other cauldrons that the United States, through opportunism, neglect, or both, helps to keep simmering. In Nigeria and Malaysia and Kenya and beyond, the choice is not stability or reform. It is either both together or it is what we have seen this week on the streets of Jakarta. •

NOTEBOOK

WHITE LINES: Green Bay Packers star Reggie White's controversial attack on the gay rights movement, delivered in a speech to the Wisconsin legislature in March, continues to cost him supporters among the general public. But he's also collected some new friends in the conservative movement, chief among them Gary Bauer, president of the Family Research Council. In Washington this week, the FRC gave White its "Family, Faith, and Freedom Award" at a special luncheon. With Republican Representatives Robert Aderholt and Ron Lewis in attendance—Dick Armey, John Ashcroft, and Newt Gingrich sent written tributes—Bauer used the occasion to defend White's statements as "morally sound convictions." From there, Bauer launched into a thinly veiled attack on CBS Sports—which, according to White, responded to his speech by withdrawing its offer to make him one of the network's regular football commentators. "Great defenders of truth should expect great criticism, but what White has suffered must not be tolerated," Bauer said. "What we see here is the politically correct form of squelching freedom of speech. It must not go unnoticed." To be sure, Bauer's embrace of White's anti-gay rhetoric is not out of character. But to give White an award, and then trash CBS as an enemy of free speech? Please. For one thing, it wasn't just the anti-gay rhetoric that got White condemned (although, as far as we're concerned, that would have been enough). The speech by White also included such memorable proclamations as the statements that blacks "like to sing and dance," whites "know how to tap into money," Hispanics "can put twenty or thirty people in one home," while Asians can "turn a television into a watch." In addition, Bauer's pronouncement that CBS's decision not to hire White was the equivalent of censorship mangles the concept of free speech. The whole system of free expression breaks down if private entities don't exercise independent judgments about what ideas they wish to broadcast. Indeed, Bauer's group has frequently criticized networks that choose not to air more family-oriented fare on television—arguing, in essence, that networks haven't exercised substantive judgments about content frequently enough. This is a novel interpretation of free expression: Content decisions by private entities are fine—just so long as Gary Bauer agrees with them.

COMMENT GUY: We are pleased to note that James Kennedy, the White House's scandal spokesman, has found his voice at last. Stung by criticism that he's seen in the press as useless because of his tight lips (See "No-Comment Man," by Dana Milbank, May 4), an unleashed Kennedy has been firing off a series of withering one-liners. On Republican complaints about the size of the White House counsel's office: "It's like an arsonist complaining about the size of the fire department," he told *The New York Times*. On the latest Tom DeLay rant: "He's lucky the speech-and-debate clause [of the Constitution] protects absurdity," he told *The Washington Post*. On Ken Starr's moonlighting? "I guess Mr. Starr is exerting a new privilege—the Meineke privilege—to make a million for himself while spending forty million dollars in taxpayers' money on an endless investigation," he told *The Christian Science Monitor*. And how does Kennedy account for his newfound volubility? "I guess you could say I've passed the ninety-day probation period," he says.

DOWN ON THE FARM: Opponents of equal rights for gays have always claimed that homosexuality is a threat to America's moral fiber. Now, however, some are claiming that gay rights threaten the actual production of food and fiber. Gay marriage, it seems, would literally be bad for agriculture. The first politician to deploy this novel logic is Jim Gordon, a real estate developer in South Carolina who's seeking the Republican nomination for state commissioner of agriculture. "American Christian values have encouraged farming; I see the cultural upheaval we're in right now as an attack against farming," Gordon said recently (according to the Associated Press). "We can't have farming based on Bob and Bob being married and a new definition of marriage.... The homosexual movement, which has come to South Carolina, needs to be reversed." Guess there won't be any show tunes at his hoedown.

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SAMPLE ERROR: As you probably know by now, the Census Bureau wants to supplement its headcount with sampling (which entails taking a super-accurate account of a few neighborhoods and then extrapolating to modify the actual headcount) in order to correct the historic and well-chronicled undercounting of minorities. Such a correction could cost Republicans a few congressional seats, but conservative opponents of the idea have always claimed to be acting on principle—chiefly, a belief that sampling is inaccurate. A near-unanimous chorus of statistical experts, including at least one Republican-appointed census official, disagrees. But, on Tuesday, a cadre of GOP-friendly interest groups calling themselves the "Citizens for an Honest Count Coalition" countered by proudly announcing that the General Accounting Office had expressed its own skepticism about sampling. The GAO is generally pretty reliable, so that would indeed be an important development—if, in fact, it were 100 percent true. Alas, while the GAO did raise important and valid concerns about the Census Bureau's ability to carry out a scientifically reliable count, it pointedly did not disavow its past endorsement of sampling. ("That's a moot point," says Peter Cleary, director of the coalition.) Quite the contrary, the GAO suggested that sampling might actually help improve accuracy—because the Census Bureau has been plagued by a shortage of qualified staff, and sampling would require less staff than the current method.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS: Due to an editor's error, an organization in a recent article by Jacob Heilbrunn ("Historionics," June 1) was misidentified. The correct name for the group is the Alliance for Preserving the Truth of the Sino-Japanese War. •

THE HARD QUESTIONS

CRASS DEMOS

By Michael Walzer

Americans are familiar with the idea of a constitutional balance of power; the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government have overlapping authority and are designed so that, in principle at least, they place one another in check. An attempt at imperial overreaching by one branch may succeed for a historical day or two, but, eventually, the other branches will react, and the balance will be restored.

Or so we hope. But there is another balance, less familiar, which is as crucial to democratic politics as the balance of power is to constitutional government. It doesn't have a name; there isn't yet a theoretical description. Think of it as a balance of actions rather than institutions. Democracy requires mobilization, deliberation, and litigation; each of these constrains and limits the others. But today, these three are badly out of balance, and the necessary corrective reactions don't seem to be forthcoming.

By mobilization I mean the engagement of large numbers of citizens in parties, movements, and interest groups with political agendas. Associations organize and educate their members, making them into effective agents of democratic politics. Democracy is not sustained by citizens who do nothing but vote. Nor will they vote regularly or intelligently unless the democratic process is mediated by a vigorous associational life.

At the same time, democratic government is not the direct rule of mobilized citizens. Mobilization stops well short of decision-making. It expresses political commitment, programmatic aspiration, emotional intensity, all of which ought to figure into decisions but ought not to determine their course. Instead, deliberation should be the determining factor—that is, public debate and negotiation. Democracy depends on a culture of argument and compromise in which ideals and interests are defended intellectually and then bargained politically.



The process of debate and decision takes place over a wide public space: the lecture circuit, panel discussions on television, op-ed pages, magazines of opinion, party conventions, debates among candidates, congressional hearings, wheeling and dealing in Washington's corridors, speeches and votes in the legislature, and so on. The result is supposed to be a decision that is workable for all the men and women affected by it and is in any case not final: Any discontented group can always reopen the argument. One of the regularly debated questions is the character of associational life. The Wagner Act—the 1935 law establishing rules for labor-management relations—is a prime example of how the deliberative process sponsors and regulates the mobilization process.

But both these processes are also restrained by litigation—that is, the use of the courts to limit the kinds of pressure that movements can bring to bear, to prevent or deter abuses of power by officeholders, to determine conflicts of interest, to provide remedies for corporate negligence and irresponsibility. As the history of the civil rights and feminist movements suggests, the courts are often responsive to the mobilization of citizens. Similarly, today's tobacco wars demonstrate the interaction of litigation and deliberation. All this is part of the balance of democratic politics.

It is as hard to get this balance right as it is to prescribe the proper constitutional balance. We expect

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action and reaction, mutual engagement and correction, in which the different branches of government and the different modes of action are all significantly and consistently involved. But it seems to me obvious, right now, that political activity is radically unbalanced. This is primarily because of the decline of associational engagement and citizen activism—which also weakens the deliberative process, depriving its debaters and negotiators of a lively, educated, and supportive constituency.

Political disagreement and conflict is less engrossing than it would be in an optimally functioning democracy. There aren't enough people paying attention. And the result is an enormous increase in the importance of litigation, which turns out to be more readily available for public consumption and more instantly exciting than mobilization or deliberation. Litigation takes up more than its share of political space; trials loom too large in our public life; lawyers are too much with us. The adversarial process is replacing the deliberative process so that people increasingly seek material and symbolic effects through litigation that they can't get, or think they can't get, or won't bother to try to get, through mobilization, argument, and negotiation.

Two examples. America's racial conflict was once well represented by the civil rights movement and its adversaries, and by the arguments about law and policy that they provoked, and by the connected court decisions. But it is not well-represented by cases like the Simpson trial, which are both displacements and distortions of the conflict. Surely the support for Simpson in the black community would never have figured so significantly in our racial politics if a strong civil rights movement with an agenda for the country was actively seeking, and getting, support from both black and white Americans.

Similarly, Kenneth Starr's pursuit of Bill Clinton is a perverse displacement of right-wing politics, whose protagonists would surely have better things to do if they were closely engaged with a political constituency and committed to a legislative program. Better the Contract with America than the pursuit of Monica Lewinsky. But the contract was only a public relations trick; right-wing politics these days is almost as disorganized as left-wing politics. The embarrassed defense of Clinton by civil rights activists and feminists is also a perverse displacement, which they too would avoid if there were a strong constituency for their proper work.

The courtroom drama has long been a popular literary, cinematic, and journalist genre. We all enjoy it, and I suppose that we are not merely passive spectators but also vicarious jurors. Still, this is a spectator sport, and it should not take the place of more active forms of participation. At the very least, it has to be balanced by the role citizens play when they watch their representatives making political decisions and try to figure out what they would do if they too were forced to decide.

There has been a good deal of writing recently about the decline of trust in government. But suspicion is often a democratic virtue. The real problem today is the decline of interest in government, and in political parties and social movements, too. Politicians become boring when citizens are not engaged and attentive. And then we are caught up in the excitements of the prosecutorial chase; we think that cheering for the fox or the hounds is a politically serious activity and that the guilt or innocence of individuals is more important than the rights and wrongs of policy. "Did he or didn't he?" we ask, which is only a good thing to do if we are also asking the central political question for democratic citizens: "Should we or shouldn't we?" •

WASHINGTON SCENE

MINING MICROSOFT

By Hanna Rosin

When Dan Schnur left Silicon Valley for a semester at Harvard, he must have thought he'd be getting a break from his circuitry-cluttered life. As the Republican director for TechNet, the high-tech industry's political group, Schnur had spent the last several months setting up meetings between politicians and high-tech executives. Now, for a few peaceful months, as a visiting fellow at the Kennedy School, he could learn, teach, read, and generally bask in the simple pleasures of a scholarly life.

Alas, it did not work out that way. Even in the shelter of the ivory tower, the cruder elements of the real world sought him out in the form of Washington lobbyists looking for high-tech business. "People were calling to ask me about start-ups I'd never heard of, like, 'Does Joe's Silicon Valley firm need Washington representation?'" recalls Schnur, who's currently back in California. "It's the great Redmond land rush, although it's not just focused on Microsoft," he says. "Everyone I know out West gets regular calls from people in Washington trying to plant a flag out there."

If you believe the insider Washington papers, you'll think that many cutting-edge high-tech companies, especially Microsoft, are rubes on Capitol Hill; what they all desperately need, according to the insiders, is (no surprise) an insider. "Microsoft is a Washington wimp," *National Journal* declared this February. The article went on to explain that, smart as he is, Bill Gates gets "outgunned and outsmarted in Washington" by his enemies, who convinced the Justice Department to renew its fight against Microsoft. No matter how much he changes his glasses, coos over his new baby, and beefs up his Washington operation, Gates is still not Washington-wise.

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Or so the lobbyists say. In truth, the high-tech industry is the great unexplored frontier for the overstaffed industry of Washington lobbyists, image-makers, and consultants. Every blow, or perceived blow, to Microsoft is food on some lucky Washington lobbyist's table. And something as monumental as the latest Justice Department suit is the Gucci Gulch equivalent of a four-car pileup, where the ambulance chasers come racing to the rescue.

Even after Microsoft caved to the pressure in 1995 and opened its own Washington office with the up-and-coming lobbyist Jack Krumholtz at its head, the establishment was not satisfied. "Jack is good but he's a relatively fresh face in Washington," says one Democrat who also lobbies for Microsoft. "We've turned them on to at least five or ten big names in town, but so far they've been unwilling to show that level of commitment to the Washington operation." But it's hard to imagine how Microsoft executives could ever prove themselves truly committed, if they haven't already. In fact, Microsoft has been slavishly deferential to Beltway customs, picking its roster of lobbyists straight out of a "Who's Who" in Washington. They've played what one more-skeptical Microsoft adviser calls the "Get Me Game," as in "Get me Haley; get me Tom."



When rival Netscape hired Bob Dole to be its public face, Microsoft scrambled to find its own big-shot Republican. They recruited former Republican National Committee Chairman Haley Barbour to do what the company elegantly calls "strategizing" but what Barbour, in his own down-home twang, calls "one-stop shopping, including good old-fashioned lobbying." Barbour, who says his firm is paid $600,000 a year, joined a vaunted crew of all-purpose consultants, lobbyists, and pollsters, including Grover Norquist (who got $60,000 for the first six months of 1997), Vin Weber, Michael Deaver, Tom Downey, Mark Penn, Peter Hart, and Robert Teeter.

As of May 19, 88 lobbyists were registered with Congress on Microsoft's behalf, including four retired members of Congress and dozens of former Hill staffers. In 1997, Microsoft spent $1.9 million on its own Washington office in addition to $1.1 million for its outside lobbying operation. (And that's not counting the pollsters and informal advisers.) How much more committed are they supposed to get?

Nevertheless, big-name lobbyists are still queuing up to offer Microsoft their services. One pollster who has done work for Microsoft says he gets about one call per week from acquaintances trying to move in on the action, each with his own tactic. A former one-term congressman "kept talking about 'supercomputers, supercomputers,' as if he had just learned the word. So I had to explain to him that Microsoft does *software*, not hardware." Barbour says his friends call often to see if the software giant needs more help. Now that he's in, though, Barbour turns them all down because he doesn't "see a need for more help."

Republicans Ken Duberstein and Bob Walker were vying for Barbour's spot before Barbour got it, according to two other Microsoft lobbyists. And Lanny Davis, Clinton's recently retired scandal flack, was also heard to be inquiring about getting Microsoft business, according to Schnur, who could not resist adding, "He is a walking, talking personification of everything Silicon Valley hates. If I were a Democrat, I'd say it on background and not on the record, but he's a typical Washington spinner." (Davis says he just offered Microsoft some friendly advice.)

Silicon Valley purists scoff at Microsoft's bowing to Washington's ways. "If you dump sacks of one hundred dollar bills in Washington, you'll come up with all the big names," says Wade Randlett, Dan Schnur's Democratic counterpart at TechNet. The true purists won't play the "Get Me Game" and regard big-name lobbyists with a wary eye. He returns the calls, then quietly chuckles to himself as the lobbyist dances awkward pirouettes to please him.

Randlett estimates that lobbyists looking for work call about once a day now. First he weeds out the total fakes, the obvious " 'Hi, my name is Joe. You have some money and I'd like some' " types. Then he looks for the well-meaning but clueless. Some automatic disqualifications: the lobbyists who pronounce Silicon Valley " 'Silicone Valley.' " Then there was the one organizing a " 'big poobah' " trade panel who tried to get Jerry Yang from Yahoo. "I was like, 'He doesn't trade anything. It's a website. Think about it for one second, please,' " says Randlett. He also mentions the lobbyists who come up with what he calls the "grotesque mismatches," trying to get Microsoft and Netscape, or Intel and Oracle, to work together on a project, and "I think to myself, there is nothing in the whole wide world these two companies are ever going to work on together." Randlett says that, in his year at TechNet, he can count the number of lobbyists who are fluent in the idioms of both Washington and Silicon Valley on three fingers.

Some of the lobbyists will break through because the demand is always there. The informality of the high-tech network means there is always some new ad hoc organization forming to tamp down the latest crisis. Each issue the industry cares about—encryption, skilled immigrants, an internet tax—has a separate group with its own set of lobbyists and pollsters and image-makers. Americans for Computer Privacy, the group fighting encryption regulation, is a mini-Microsoft, with the smooth bipartisan mix of Ed Gillespie, Dick Armey's former policy and communications director who now works with Barbour, and Jack Quinn, former White House counsel.

The conservative anti-regulation lobbyists claim they look forward to the day when the government lays off the industry and all the lobbyists will be "out of a job," as Barbour puts it. But Barbour, for one, fears that day will never come. Once the government starts regulating, there will be "an explosion—an explosion of representation in Washington," says Barbour. And you can almost see him sadly, reluctantly, counting his share of the winnings. •

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In defense of prescription drugs.

OVERREACTION?

By Arthur Allen

On April 15, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and other newspapers carried an alarming front-page story based on an article in the *Journal of the American Medical Association*. Adverse drug reactions—and these were not doctor errors but simply bad reactions to drugs administered properly in the normal course of treatment—were the sixth, or maybe even the fourth, leading cause of death in the U.S., deadlier than diabetes or pneumonia. The study, a meta-analysis of 39 previous studies since 1964, estimated that, in 1994, 2.2 million of 33 million U.S. hospital patients had suffered serious adverse drug reactions, 106,000 of them fatal.

That would mean about one of every 300 hospital patients dies from a reaction to properly prescribed medication—a pretty disturbing finding. Or is it? Just as the recent headlines about a "cure for cancer" turned out to be overblown, so, most likely, is the epidemic of fatal prescription drug reactions. This tempest in an I.V. tube may owe its existence as much to one researcher's agenda as it does to a convincing interpretation of the data.

To be sure, there is no denying that a lot of people are harmed by drugs in the hospital, nor is there any question that hospital staff members routinely fail to report adverse reactions. While the raw numbers in the *JAMA* article may be high, they "are not off by an order of magnitude," says Donald Goldmann, medical director of quality improvement at Children's Hospital in Boston. Although the National Center for Health Statistics reports only about 200 drug-reaction deaths per year, the center itself admits that figure is probably too low. The reason for the underreporting, Goldmann says, is that anyone who reports a drug-induced problem is "just asking for a major lawsuit."

When you think about it, it's not surprising that adverse reactions would be on the rise. There are 9,000 prescription drugs on the market today, compared to about 300 in 1965. The more drugs, the higher the chance of a mistake. Overworked doctors will fail to notice allergies or kidney-function signals on a chart; harried nurses will hear and transcribe the wrong prescriptions; possible drug interactions will be overlooked. The epidemiologists I have spoken with agree that the *JAMA* article points to a serious problem that deserves attention from health care professionals. They question, however, the article's description of an epidemic of routine drug poisoning, saying that, in fact, most of the morbidity is due to inexact or improper drug administration.

After all, it's one thing to say that more people are experiencing adverse reactions and quite another to say that more people are dying from adverse reactions. While this latest *JAMA* study was an analysis of 39 heterogeneous bits of research conducted over three decades at a nonrandom collection of hospitals, previous in-depth studies—based on more limited samples—suggest that it is difficult to establish the kind of causal relationship this latest study so roundly embraces.

The key fact to keep in mind is that "most hospital deaths are a combination of factors," as Dr. John Burke, chief of clinical epidemiology at LDS Hospital in Salt Lake City, explains. Previous studies in the adverse reaction literature have generated a one-in-300 figure by looking at patients who suffered adverse drug events and then asking how many of them died. These studies suggested that the deaths were *linked* to adverse reactions—but that is not the same as saying the adverse reaction *caused* the deaths, as the authors of the new study insist. For each death the new study considers, Burke says, the skeptical reader should ask, "Did the adverse reaction cause death, or was it simply a marker for a person who was very sick and got lots of drugs?"

Frequently, the latter possibility will prove true. According to the National Center for Health Statistics, in 1995, among 17,558 patients who suffered adverse drug reactions and later died in the hospital, 80 percent were 65 or older; presumably, a high number of these elderly patients were hospitalized with cancer or other grave systemic ills. (While the center's fatal-reaction statistics are low, there is no reason to believe its age breakdown on hospital fatalities would be off the mark.) This pattern makes sense, given that the drugs most frequently associated with serious reactions—morphine and other painkillers, anti-stroke drugs, broad-spectrum antibiotics—are not the kind of drugs given to teenagers with dislocated fingers. A 1997 *JAMA* study at a teaching hospital with one of the most sophisticated adverse reaction monitoring systems in the country found that patients whose deaths were attributed to adverse reactions were taking an average of 18 different drugs at the time of their deaths.

Of course, health care providers should try to prevent adverse reactions—and, as a matter of fact, some reforms are already in the works. Epidemiologists like Burke and Lucian Leape at the Harvard School of Public Health would like to create for hospital pharmacology something like the computerized fail-safe checklist that airplane pilots use for takeoffs and landings. The AMA recently set up a foundation for improvements in patient safety. And the Health Care Financing Administration is considering a requirement that hospitals install adverse reaction surveillance systems to qualify for Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement.

But human error is, well, human—and even more stringent requirements might not make an appreciable difference. "Errors happen all the time," says Leape.

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"We need to redesign the systems to make sure they don't make the mistakes. But, if they set goals that are unachievable, people are going to have a strong incentive not to report."

Indeed, it's possible that the only way to drastically reduce adverse reaction deaths would be to drastically reduce the use of otherwise beneficial drugs—which, as it happens, may be precisely what this study's lead author had in mind. He is a Canadian researcher named Bruce Pomeranz, an alternative-medicine enthusiast whose previous claims to fame include contributing to a 1988 *Nature* article documenting a study supporting the homeopathic principle of extreme dilution. This is the notion that minuscule dilutions of a medicine, down to solutions containing less than a molecule, continue to have therapeutic effects. Most scientists believe the placebo effect accounts for any improvements such homeopathic remedies provide. But the *Nature* article, whose lead author was the French scientist Jacques Benveniste, suggested that medicines might leave some imprint on the water molecules remaining in the diluted solutions, a theory whose basis is sketchy. After initiating its own investigation, *Nature* published a response (co-written by *Nature*'s editor) calling the article "fanciful" and "a delusion."

Pomeranz, whose lab is in the University of Toronto Zoology Department, describes himself as "a neuroscientist whose job is to disprove." Actually, his work seems more directed at proving the unprovable. In his research and in statements he has made in interviews, Pomeranz has shown an inclination to believe in the biological effects of such phenomena as parapsychology, homeopathy, and multiple-chemical sensitivity. He has investigated these and other fields with the hope, presumably, of yielding evidence his more dubious peers will be forced to accept. Pomeranz, who was out of North America during the preparation of this article, did not respond to phone and e-mail messages. One of his coauthors, University of Toronto medical student Jason Lazarou, said Pomeranz was led to the adverse reaction inquiry by his belief that patient reactions to such opioids as morphine were going underreported.

Pomeranz arrived at this conviction after more than 20 years of investigating the biomechanics of acupuncture. His work has done much to put acupuncture onto the list of therapies that specialists use for chronic pain patients. The following remark, in a 1996 interview with the journal *Alternative Therapies*, gives a sense of where Pomeranz is coming from: "If you do proper acupuncture, you can't hurt anybody. You can't say that about drugs.... So, as a first line of treatment, why not try the conservative, the safe acupuncture treatment?" The side effects of drugs, he added, "are the raison d'être for alternative medicine."

But, be that as it may, Pomeranz is unlikely to convince patients, let alone physicians, to forgo the exploding biotechnical pharmacopoeia and surrender themselves to the murky ministrations of naturopathy. "Americans are in love with drugs, and you're not going to change that," says Leape. Indeed, it's not just Americans—a leading pain specialist, Dr. C. Stratton Hill of the M.D. Anderson Cancer Center in Houston, told me that, during a recent visit to China, many of the acupuncturists he spoke with were interested in switching to morphine for cancer pain treatment. Sure, there's always the chance of harmful side effects. But most doctors figure that's the price of using treatment that usually succeeds. Who can blame them?

ARTHUR ALLEN is a freelance journalist based in Washington, D.C., who reports regularly on medical and scientific issues.

WHITE HOUSE WATCH

SMALL TALK

By Dana Milbank

The White House's dialogue on race has become a monologue now that Ward Connerly and the other conservatives have pulled out. But those who crave the politics of chatter needn't despair: The national discussion on Social Security drones on unimpeded. If you missed President Clinton's Kansas City gabfest in April, wait until you hear what some organizers have suggested for June's extravaganza. They want Al Gore to host a Social Security forum in the Northeast to talk about—oh, dear—the actuarial assumptions behind Social Security reform. This cannot be a good idea for the veep. Just picture him standing in front of a chart with a pointer, saying, "You see, folks, if we reduce the thirty-two percent factor in the PIA formula to 22.4 percent and the fifteen percent factor to 10.5 percent by 2030, the long-range OASDI actuarial deficit drops by 1.32 percent of taxable payroll."



Gore, thankfully, will instead opt for something less torpid—maybe a discussion of private savings accounts or of reform's impact on various age groups. On the other hand, it doesn't much matter what Gore says in June in the East or what Clinton says the following month in the West at the third of four events. The object of the exercise isn't talking so much as stalling—until December, when the midterm election is done and it's safer to make some actual proposals. It's not as if we need a national debate to reach consensus that Social Security needs fixing. The president's own pollsters, Penn, Schoen & Berland, reported to the Democratic Leadership Council last November that 77 percent of Americans—and 75 percent of Democrats—

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agree that Social Security will go bankrupt without changes. Nor is there any great mystery about what type of change will be most popular. Seventy-two percent of the public—and 71 percent of Democrats—favors a two-tiered system that includes private individual savings. And yet, we must keep talking for another seven months. It is our civic duty.

I've done my share, and you should, too. It's even easier than voting. Simply dial 1-888-735-ADSS (that's short for Americans Discuss Social Security), and tell the courteous operator what you think about our favorite entitlement program. Perhaps you've seen the ad, in *The New York Times* (or even here in TNR), about this "nonpartisan effort to inform Americans about a critical issue and to give them a voice in its resolution." The ad says the group, funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts, welcomes "your ideas, your comments, and especially your involvement." I called the number and reached what sounded like a room full of telemarketers. I told the operator I didn't understand a word of all this mumbo-jumbo about Social Security reform and asked if he could explain. He said he could not but promised to have somebody call me, and he took my name, number, and address—zip code first. I felt empowered. I had seized my chance "to hear and be heard," as the ad says. There was only one disappointment. They still haven't called back.



DRAWING BY VINT LAWRENCE FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC

Fortunately, the Social Security talk is also going on in the White House, where it might actually do some good. The man in charge of hammering out Clinton's Social Security plan is Gene Sperling, who runs the National Economic Council. Now that Frank Raines is leaving the Office of Management and Budget, Sperling is taking a more dominant role on economic policy. Much of the Social Security discussion takes place in Sperling's office upstairs in the West Wing. At the conference table, Treasury Secretary Bob Rubin invariably grabs a seat at the head of the table opposite Sperling. Social Security Commissioner Ken Apfel, Deputy Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, Gore Chief of Staff Ron Klain, Raines, and Janet Yellen of the Council of Economic Advisers are among the other regulars.

The debate is, essentially, over whether to fix Social Security solely with incremental changes (say, raising the retirement age or lowering cost-of-living increases), allowing government to invest some of the trust fund in private securities, or creating private retirement accounts for all Americans. The last option, a longtime conservative trope, would represent the most dramatic change—and, to many liberals, the most threatening one. (They fear that even partial privatization could undermine the program's redistributive qualities.) But it is getting serious attention and appears increasingly likely. Clinton, in Kansas City, said he would consider private accounts but not a payroll tax increase. This appears to be the legacy-minded Clinton's private view as well; he's been taking advice on the subject from, among others, Senator John Breaux, a centrist Democrat.

Sperling, viewed in the past as doing Rubin's bidding, is determined to be a neutral broker on Social Security, and he's keeping a close eye on Clinton's wishes. He's playing his cards close to his vest in the talks. In the end, though, he will probably be less opposed to market options than most presume, and he's likely to go for some form of private accounts once he's convinced there are sufficient protections for the existing program.

Rubin, who was an investment banker by trade, has raised some of the strongest cautions about letting the trust fund play the market. Supporters of that idea—including liberal social insurance analysts like Henry Aaron (of the Brookings Institution) and Robert Reischauer (the former Congressional Budget Office director)—think this would allow Social Security to capture stock market growth without eroding Social Security's redistributive ability. But the trust fund investment could be an administrative mess, put the basic program

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at risk, and cause awkward problems for the government. (Does it invest in tobacco stocks? Does Congress or some other body have control of the funds?) Rubin has fewer qualms about the idea of private investment accounts.

Probably the market's strongest voice at the table is Summers, who has talked up the market-based options and is seen as a backer of private accounts (though he hasn't committed himself). Summers, an academic economist who sees reform as an opportunity to increase the nation's savings rate, also gains more of a prominent role with the departure of Raines. He will lead the policy formulation with Sperling. At the other end of the table, ideologically, is Social Security Commissioner Apfel, who prefers incremental changes—i.e., the kind Clinton seems reluctant to endorse—and would likely resist private accounts unless they're a supplement to the existing system. Klain is seen as somewhere in between the two. (Gore, his boss, will likely want to grab the middle ground between potential opponents Dick Gephardt on the left and Bob Kerrey on the right.)

The group, meeting since October, briefly considered coming up with a Social Security fix before the midterm elections. Calling the gatherings in Sperling's office "special issues" meetings to avoid drawing attention, they weighed plans devoting 75 or 100 percent of the budget surplus to repairing Social Security's projected deficit. But they decided against it, largely because such a plan, depending on the size of the surplus, could either come up short or amount to overkill. They also figured that such a half-fix would remove the pressure to find a long-term structural fix for Social Security. They instead opted for Clinton's State of the Union gambit to freeze the surplus until the program is fixed.

The group is in no hurry to come up with a policy, and it needn't deliver one to Clinton before Christmas. But, while nothing has been ruled in or out, the range of debate in the White House is fairly narrow for such a huge issue. Nobody talks of full privatization, and nobody talks about a big payroll tax hike. Part of that reflects the consensus outside of the building. Now that Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan has acquiesced to individual accounts (Republicans will surely demand them), the once unthinkable appears increasingly inevitable. This week, a bipartisan commission proposed a plan that includes personal accounts and a higher retirement age. If the Democrats retake the House in November, all bets are off. But, barring that, look for a Social Security plan with modest private accounts—equal to about two percent of income. To pay for it, government would divert some money from current payroll tax receipts and then use the budget surplus to make up the rest. And expect a variety of incremental fixes—raising the retirement age and the cap on taxable income, fiddling with bracket calculations for new retirees—to clear the projected trust fund deficit.

Of course, you'll have to wait another seven months to know for sure. In the meantime, we've got a whole lot of talking to do. Call the toll-free number today. Hear and be heard. Operators are standing by. •

The good news about India's nuclear tests.

EXPLODING MYTHS

By Pratap Bhanu Mehta

India's decision to conduct five nuclear tests has occasioned as much celebration in India as it has engendered condemnation around the world. For many in the international community, the decision exemplifies India's misplaced sense of priorities. Its attempt to secure great-power status without attending to the surer foundations of economic well-being appears misguided. For others, this decision represents a decisive break with the best moral intimations bequeathed by Gandhi and Nehru, who, for all their failings, articulated an idealism that now seems to have vanished.

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These considerations ought not to be taken lightly. But to condemn India's decision without condemning the circumstances that led to it is to engage in the same politics of bad faith that has rendered American criticisms of India's actions less credible. It is to hold India to standards that none of those who judge it has upheld.

India's security dilemmas are acute. To its north lies China, a formidable adversary with which India fought a humiliating war in 1962. To its west lies Pakistan, with which India fought three wars in the first 25 years of its independence. China's nuclear arsenal has a commanding presence in the region, and Pakistan has developed a substantial nuclear and missile program with China's assistance. Given the balance-of-power considerations,

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the surprise is not that these tests occurred but that it took so long for them to occur. India's strategic situation was made more ignominious by the fact that the American abdication of any principles in its stand on China seemed to justify the view that might makes right in international politics. It's a matter for regret that India's restraint on the nuclear issue meant that the world turned a blind eye to India's strategic realities. India is now equal to the five declared nuclear powers in at least one respect: It is acting upon the kind of strategic considerations that they themselves have long acted upon.

But, while the strategic and technical considerations that went into this decision have long been in the making, the current tests were directed as much at a domestic as an international audience. The major party in the ruling coalition, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), had openly declared its intentions to make India into a nuclear power. Since assuming office, this government has been struggling to find its feet. On the one hand, its concerted attempts to portray itself as a moderate party left it without a clear ideological direction. On the other hand, the political brinkmanship of many of its coalition partners seems to pull the government in many different directions at once. In such circumstances, the nuclear tests have, temporarily at any rate, given the government an aura of credibility and decisiveness. It is difficult to think of any decision in India's recent history that has had such overwhelming public support.

The extent of this support extends far beyond the partisans of Hindu nationalism narrowly understood. There is little doubt that these tests would not have been technically feasible unless previous governments had laid the groundwork. But, while India had long ago compromised the idealism of the early days of its leadership of the nonaligned movement, none of its previous governments had been able to jettison entirely the high moralism that was bequeathed to the state by Gandhi and Nehru. The BJP has, in this respect, more expressly articulated the desire for a nuclear deterrent that many Indians had long felt but never quite owned up to.

For all of India's strategic conundrums, this desire is motivated less by strategic concerns than by psychological ones. The last two decades have been trying ones for India. A spate of secessionist movements, a widespread sense of its declining importance in world affairs, and a realization that many of its highest hopes remain unredeemed have underscored India's insecurities and vulnerabilities. With two of the pillars of India's self-image since independence—its state-led mixed economy and its central role in the nonaligned movement—appearing increasingly irrelevant in light of the vicissitudes of world politics, India has been struggling to redefine itself. Economic reforms carried out in the early '90s have brought a new vibrancy to certain sectors of the economy, but these have yet to be translated into enduring gains that all can share. Despite the fact that its democracy remains the repository of immense hopes, its institutions often appear overburdened and ineffective in the face of the overwhelming tasks confronting them. The uncertainties of its emerging economic and political landscape have contributed to a palpable, if quiet, crisis of confidence. Thus, though the tests are not, in any sense, a shortcut to fulfilling India's best aspirations, they have boosted its flagging morale. Accordingly, public opinion in India in the aftermath of the tests has focused less on their strategic ramifications than on the considerable scientific and organizational achievement that the tests represent.

What will be the consequences of these tests? Both internationally and domestically, the contingencies of politics will determine the outcome rather than an overall logic of history or economics. There is no doubt that these tests have consolidated support for the BJP. For those who worry that this party's coopting of Indian nationalism has perilously exacerbated India's practical predicaments, this ought to be a matter of grave concern.

But there are significant silver linings. The most curious fact about public opinion in India in the aftermath of the tests is that Pakistan has hardly figured in the discussion at all. In part, this is the result of attempts by the government to portray China as India's main adversary and competitor. But it is also consistent with the thesis that these tests are less a product of India's past obsessions with Pakistan than they are a product of its current desire to demonstrate to itself that it is still capable of a complex organized endeavor. India's political elite needed to show that, despite the fragmentation of its politics, it is capable of uniting behind a national project. To be sure, any adversarial relationships in international politics should be avoided, so India's sparring with China and diplomatic war with the United States are certainly a cause for lament. Nonetheless, whatever the strategic imperatives, the less Pakistan remains in the public consciousness in India, the healthier it will be for Indian politics, and especially for Indian Muslims. It is undeniable that there are factions allied with the ruling BJP whose history of baiting Muslims ought to remain a matter of grave concern, but, to the extent that this display of nationalism has not been immediately and narrowly directed against Pakistan, there is cause for hope.

Much will depend on how the government chooses to translate its newfound credibility into legislative gains. In some quarters, American sanctions may be used as an argument for the virtues of an economic autarky that makes India less dependent on the vagaries of world opinion. But, in recent days, the Indian government has granted significant mineral and oil exploration rights to foreign companies, including American ones. The decision to open what were among the most protected sectors of the Indian economy represents an amazing volte-face for a ruling party that had earlier proclaimed allegiance to *swadeshi*, or economic nationalism. Having acquired impeccable nationalist credentials, the BJP is in a position—in the way that only Nixon could go to China—to liberalize the economy further than its predecessors did. Whether it succeeds will depend on its capacities for deft political maneuver-

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ing, but it certainly appears willing to move in that direction.

As for India's loss of credibility internationally, this has been significantly offset by the failure of the G-8 nations to agree on economic sanctions. The United States seems only slightly less isolated on this issue than India was on its decision to conduct the tests. In any event, foreign aid does not contribute significantly to the Indian economy, and American opposition to loans to India from financial institutions does not have many immediate consequences. The effects of sanctions on investor confidence remain to be seen, though they too do not yet appear significant.

Whatever India's intentions, the pressure on Pakistan to conduct its own nuclear tests is immense, although Pakistan is more vulnerable to sanctions than India. It is not unlikely that both India and Pakistan—after conducting its own tests—will join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Two considerations may be decisive. One will be the extent to which Indian scientists feel that they have enough data for their computer simulations to make further tests unnecessary; the second will be the ability of the Indian government to present accession to the treaty as a political triumph rather than a capitulation.

Will India's tests affect proliferation in other nations? The countries that had strategic reasons to acquire such weapons had them independently of India's nuclear tests, and the direct bearing of these events on their desire to procure nuclear weapons is less than clear. India has no interests or incentives to aid in further proliferation, and nor does, in the final analysis, Pakistan. It's plausible that underlying American anxiety about these tests owes less to the fact that India conducted them than that Pakistan, if it conducts some in response, may be more amenable to sharing its know-how with other powers in the Middle East. This fear is groundless. And fears of a new arms race in South Asia are also too alarmist for the simple reason that one is already underway. India's tests represent one step in an ongoing process and do not necessarily signify a sudden expansion of military budgets. And if, as there is some evidence to suggest, the logic of nuclear deterrence makes a conventional war less likely, it may not necessarily prove more burdensome than current defense expenditures already are.

One of the sadder truths of modern diplomatic history has been the way U.S. policies on South Asia have been governed by a curious combination of indifference and contempt. The tone of the American response to India's tests leaves it unclear whether what the U.S. most objects to is the fact that the tests occurred or that they've revealed the limits of the United States' ability to get its way. Sanctions will only serve to fuel India's perception that the United States will punish India for far less than what it excuses in China. If the United States wants to play the role of honest broker, it will have to recognize that the coin of exchange in the politics of South Asia is much the same as it is the world over: the quest for national self-esteem. •

The high-tech industry's low-profile lobbying.

SILICON SMOOTHIES

By Jason Zengerle

Dan Scheinman works for a high-tech Silicon Valley behemoth called Cisco Systems. His title is vice president of legal and government affairs. But don't even think of calling him an industry lobbyist. "The Washington way to look at all this is that we're narrow, we're self-interested, we're an 'association,'" he says. "But we're broad-visioned and we're trying to find where we can play a role and make a difference in this country's future."

Normally, skeptical Washingtonians would disregard such high-minded rhetoric. After all, it's no great secret that realizing Silicon Valley's vision of a "new economy" happens to involve such conspicuously self-serving reforms as toughening standards for securities fraud suits (which are frequently filed against high-tech firms), blocking Internet taxation (which would curtail online commerce), and easing immigration restrictions (which drive up the cost of high-skilled labor).

But, while many instinctively disbelieve the petroleum industry when it tries to dress up its anti-environmentalism as forward-thinking idealism, the high-tech lobby miraculously gets away with a similar ploy. Indeed, from California's state legislators right on up to the president of the United States, politicians have been granting Silicon Valley more respect and more access than even the (admittedly substantial) amount of hard cash that Valley executives are con-

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tributing to campaign coffers would seem to warrant. The idea that Silicon Valley's futurist vision somehow separates it from parochial lobbies has become a conventional conceit—and it goes a long way toward explaining how, in a remarkably short time, Silicon Valley has moved from the margins of influence in Washington to center stage.

As recently as two years ago, Silicon Valley was considered essentially off-limits to anyone who didn't have a computer science degree or a hefty supply of venture capital. Today, the Valley is rivaling Hollywood as a travel destination for ambitious politicians. Politicos who sometimes can't even operate a word processor, much less grasp the intricacies of programming, and who are almost always seeking to collect money rather than invest it, are being greeted by many in the Valley with open arms. The clearest manifestation of this new welcome policy is the Technology Network—or, in Valleyspeak, TechNet. A new bipartisan political action committee (or, in Valleyspeak, "political service organization") comprised of roughly 100 Silicon Valley executives, TechNet is seeking to forge ties between the political and high-tech worlds where few had existed before.

To understand just how well it has succeeded, consider the tale of Wade Randlett, TechNet's Democratic political director. After seven largely fruitless years of political work in the Valley, helping the handful of Democrats who had bothered to look there for support, Randlett has recently become a very busy host. "You talk to Wade during a recess week, and he's like an air traffic controller," quips an aide to a Democratic senator who has become an increasingly frequent visitor to the Valley. "He's got politicians stacked up like planes." During the recent April recess, Randlett had a full radar screen: Senators Barbara Boxer, Chris Dodd, Bob Kerrey, and Patty Murray, as well as Representatives Cal Dooley and Ellen Tauscher, all were paying visits. "And those are just the federals," said a harried Randlett, speaking on his car phone as he rushed back from a breakfast with Dooley and Tauscher to a make a few final fund-raising calls for an afternoon reception with Murray. "We've had state politicians as well."

Randlett's counterpart at TechNet is Dan Schnur, a former spokesman for California Governor Pete Wilson who works the Republican side of things. Both of them try to wire party leaders with the heavy hitters in Silicon Valley and vice versa. To be sure, campaign contributions serve as an effective lure. Barely a year into its existence, TechNet has hosted 23 fund-raisers that have raised between two and four million dollars. But that's only part of TechNet's attraction. For the politicians, interest in groups like TechNet represents a combination of factors—not just fund-raising expediency, but intellectual curiosity, genuine admiration, and a little awe, as well. "These guys are the rock stars of the nineties," one Senate staffer says of the Silicon Valley executives. "Everybody sees them as an attractive lobby group that doesn't have the baggage that some other interest groups have." Or, in the irresistible formulation of Schnur: "I've never seen a politician in either party who's against the future. A community that can talk about the future has a cachet that other industries don't have."

There are, of course, some valid reasons for that cachet—chief among them the fact that Silicon Valley executives frequently possess specialized knowledge that politicians want to tap. Politicians "have an impossible job," Brook Byers, a partner in the venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins Caulfield & Byers, earnestly explains. "They have all this stuff to deal with, they're not given enough staff, they have a measly budget, and a lot of the issues that are coming up now are things like patent reform, human cloning, encryption, Internet taxation, medical privacy, genetics, the year 2000 bug."

As a result, more and more politicians look to Silicon Valley as a source of information and education about issues. This, in turn, means that, instead of having to send lobbyists to represent their interests, Silicon Valley executives get to schmooze with key politicians themselves. It's true that other interest groups have been known to orchestrate similar encounters. But TechNet's ability to gain intimate audiences with officials at the highest levels of government is truly impressive. Already, TechNet has staged over 70 "issue briefings"—small tête-à-têtes frequently likened to "graduate seminars on the new economy"—between its members and various politicos, from Speaker Newt Gingrich to Vice President Al Gore. Gore, in particular, has warmed to the outreach. A noted technophile himself, he has assembled an informal cadre of advisers—cutely monickered the "Gore-Techs"—who for the past 18 months have met with the vice president every four to six weeks.

This level of access has tangible benefits. "If you strike the fancy of a given candidate's issues, it doesn't stop at a half-hour conversation," says Jim Hornthal, the chairman and founder of the online travel service Preview Travel. "You meet with their staff; there are white papers they want from you. It's very flattering, and I've had enough of it to believe that it can make a difference." Gore, says one of his advisers, "thinks of them as a key network of support and information. They help him keep in touch with scientific issues, technological issues, things that he thinks and cares about. I don't think they're thought of as a set of interests inside of Washington or outside of Washington."

But, of course, they are a set of interests. While high-minded topics like education and Immanuel Kant tend to dominate the Gore-Tech meetings, for example, issues like encryption and Internet taxation inevitably come up. Whether it's with Gore or any of the other politicians with whom TechNet has ties, the executives aren't afraid to dispense some friendly advice—and that

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advice frequently gets heeded. "They get the meetings with the president; they get the meetings with the vice president; they get the meetings with the important members of Congress when they come back to Washington as a delegation of CEOs," says Cal Dooley, the California Democratic representative who has courted Silicon Valley. "And it's not unusual for those folks to pretty much say a lot of things the CEOs want to hear."

TechNet members, naturally, deny that self-interest taints their counsel. But Silicon Valley has always had a clearly defined set of interests in government policy—even going back to the days when the Valley was enjoying the reputation of being an entrepreneurial Eden blissfully unconcerned with politics. For example, the semiconductor industry, which during the 1960s did a good deal of business with both the Pentagon and with NASA, set up government affairs offices in the 1970s to lobby Washington for protection from Japanese competitors. Similarly, the Valley's biotech firms, which started up in the late 1970s, have worked from the beginning with the Food and Drug Administration to speed up approval of their products.

In fact, most Silicon Valley companies belong to one of the various trade groups that represent segments of the high-tech industry, whether it's the American Electronics Association or the Biotech Industry Organization. Additionally, there have always been a handful of solo actors in the Valley who have been involved in politics, particularly at the state level. The software mogul Ron Unz ran for governor in 1994 and is now financing the controversial June ballot initiative to severely restrict bilingual education, and the late David Packard of Hewlett-Packard was the major financial backer behind the 1996 ballot initiative that ushered in California's "blanket" primary.

It's true that, until recently, most of this activity has been scattershot and episodic. Even in 1992, when candidate Bill Clinton grabbed national headlines by securing endorsements from some Silicon Valley executives, thereby burnishing his reputation as a pro-business New Democrat, the splash belied the modest reality: a press conference announcing the endorsements and some small campaign contributions from about 25 individuals. "That was one of the best examples in history of nature abhorring a vacuum," chortles Floyd Kvamme, a venture capitalist with Kleiner Perkins and a prominent Valley Republican. "He only got twenty or twenty-five folks out of six thousand, but it was twenty or twenty-five more than anybody else had."

And, if the Valley was generally apolitical in the best of times, it became outright hostile to politics in 1995 after Clinton, in a sop to the trial lawyers, vetoed a bill that impeded shareholder lawsuits—the bane of the high-tech industry due to high-tech firms' frequent and volatile stock price fluctuations. Even though Congress managed to override Clinton's veto—the only override Clinton has suffered—the residual ill will toward the president, who many in the Valley assumed would be on their side given their token show of support in 1992, led the Valley to give up on politics altogether. "In December 1995, saying 'I hate politics' was a very credible Decathlon Club conversation," remarks Randlett.

But all that changed in 1996. That's when San Diego attorney Bill Lerach rolled out Proposition 211, a ballot initiative that proposed to make shareholder suits easier to file in California state courts. The initiative would have essentially undermined the law Congress had passed the previous year, and the extreme threat the initiative posed to Silicon Valley's bottom line (Apple founder Steve Jobs likened 211 to a "neutron bomb going off in the boardroom") shook the Valley out of its political somnolence.

John Doerr, the storied Kleiner Perkins venture capitalist who secured the financing for some of the Valley's most successful start-ups, including Netscape and Sun Microsystems, tackled the initiative battle with the same fervor he had displayed in the business world. Doerr organized an anti-211 coalition, and, in the span of several months, he helped raise $40 million to spend against the initiative. Randlett, whom Doerr hired to help with the fight, explains the change in attitude: "Saying 'I hate politics' in May 1996, you'd look like you were refusing to do your share."

When Clinton came trolling for money and support in the Valley for his 1996 campaign, it was a pretty good bet that he would have to flip his position on securities fraud suits and oppose 211. He did, and the endorsements and campaign contributions flowed at a much greater rate than they had four years earlier: Seventy-eight high-tech executives publicly endorsed Clinton; Doerr, a registered Republican, sponsored a $50,000-a-head fund-raiser for the Democratic National Committee. State politicians who opposed 211, particularly the Democrats who bucked the powerful trial lawyer and labor lobbies, were similarly rewarded. Over the course of the campaign, the Valley began to build new relationships with politicians. Doerr and some other executives even attended the Democratic Convention in Chicago to hobnob with party leaders. When Election Day came, 211 went down by a whopping three-to-one margin. The margin was so wide that the anti-211 forces felt safe in diverting nearly $2 million of their $40 million war chest to help defeat a separate initiative that raised taxes on the wealthiest one percent of Californians.

The 211 fight taught Silicon Valley executives an important lesson: Staying out of politics, or entering only to put out fires, was no longer a viable option. The $40 million they spent to defeat 211 was necessary only because they hadn't had any preexisting capital with politicians to draw on. Starting fresh for each new fight was going to be a costly and time-consuming process. So, when 211 was defeated, the infrastructure

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Doerr had built to defeat it was left intact, and TechNet was born.

To prove that they truly are above the usual interest-group fray, TechNet members invariably point to the fact that one of TechNet's primary concerns is kindergarten-through-twelfth-grade education. Although the group originally had a predictably narrow focus on putting more technology in the classroom—an early proposal was to equip teachers with cellular phones, and a pet project of the group has been a Web interface called the "Education Dashboard" that would allow parents to monitor their children's classroom performance through the Internet—TechNet now pushes for broader educational reform. Last year, high-tech executives staged a public endorsement of Clinton's call for national education standards, and a number of those same executives have started up a venture capital fund to help improve California schools. More significantly, in May, the group used the threat of a $15 million initiative drive to enact legislation expanding California's charter school system. The California Teachers' Association, which had previously stymied charter school legislation, saw the writing on the wall and backed down. "I don't know if the auto makers or the trial lawyers give a damn about education," Hornthal says. "They should. We do."

However, TechNet's interest in education is not purely altruistic. Business interests have a long history of promoting education reform as a means of ensuring a skilled workforce down the road. And, when it comes to TechNet's other issues, the group is certainly no different than a typical trade association. The issue that continues to dominate TechNet's agenda is the pure bottom-line matter of securities litigation reform. High-tech executives have lobbied fiercely for uniform national standards for shareholder suits—standards requiring that all class action shareholder suits be filed in federal courts and thus strike a preemptive death blow at any future backdoor, state-level attack like Prop 211. The lobbying has paid off in the form of uniform national standards legislation that has the support of not only Republicans but also a number of Democrats, including Clinton, who opposed the 1995 securities litigation bill. The uniform national standards legislation recently passed the Senate and is now expected to be passed by the House and signed into law by Clinton during this session of Congress.

With victory near on the securities front, TechNet is moving on to immigration. The group is now pressing to raise the quota, currently set at 65,000 a year, for H1-B visas, the temporary work visa for high-skilled immigrants. TechNet complains that Silicon Valley is suffering a high-tech worker shortage and therefore needs to hire skilled foreign nationals to fill thousands of open jobs. The General Accounting Office, however, has recently questioned industry job studies purporting to show this worker shortage; a number of opponents of the increase, particularly organized labor, claim that the Valley is merely suffering from a cheap-labor shortage. These critics point to the many American programmers over the age of 35 who are out of work and note that software firms are currently hiring just two percent of applicants—factors that definitely belie an actual labor shortage. Still, legislation raising the quota just passed the Senate and is working its way through the House. And the White House, after initially indicating that it opposed an H1-B increase, is now sending signals that the matter is open for discussion. Randlett, who has been TechNet's point man on the issue, is sanguine about his group's chances: "I'm always optimistic about this administration doing the right thing on new economy issues."

And, while TechNet as an organization lobbies only on education, securities, and immigration, its members have concerns on a number of other fronts—and, given the high levels of access they enjoy, have frequently been heard out on those concerns. High-tech executives have an obvious interest in the administration's Internet policy, for instance, and the general hands-off, self-regulatory approach taken by the White House's Internet adviser Ira Magaziner has been warmly received in the Valley. "We've worked intimately with Magaziner," Randlett gushes about TechNet's relationship with the administration. "I can't imagine how it could be better." (Magaziner, for his part, acknowledges that he "interacts with them quite a bit" but says that his decisions have been guided by policy, not political, considerations. "By and large, what they've wanted are things that we've wanted," he explains. "Our policy interests have converged.")

Of particular importance to Silicon Valley is the White House's support for a moratorium on taxing business transactions conducted over the Internet—a move that would create, at least for a time, a global, tax-free zone of commerce. "There was cause and effect," one Silicon Valley executive boasts about the White House position. "We spoke; they listened; they drafted policy." The National Governors Association, fearing a revenue loss of ten to twelve billion dollars a year if states cannot impose sales taxes on electronic commerce, has strongly opposed the White House on the issue. The NGA has worked with some in Congress to draft compromise legislation that would establish a shorter moratorium and grandfather in existing state taxes on Internet access and commerce. The White House and Silicon Valley, however, have not yet indicated whether they favor the compromise plan.

Another critical issue to the Valley is the administration's policy on encryption—and here the high-tech executives have run into some opposition. Prodded by the FBI and the National Security Council, the White House has continued to support restrictions on the sale of new encryption technology designed to stymie government surveillance of e-mails, phone conversations, and financial records. The FBI and the NSC worry that encryption might be used to shield illegal

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activities, ranging from drug-running to international terrorism, while Silicon Valley presses for the lifting of encryption restrictions for two reasons. First, consumers will only engage in Internet commerce if they're confident that their transactions are secure. Second, foreign high-tech companies, unencumbered by restrictions, are already marketing encryption technology. "We have a product and we need to export it to our international customers," says Kim Polese, the CEO of the Internet software maker Marimba. "We need to provide strong encryption to compete with other companies. It's a real issue tied to our bottom line." Polese's view, which she has had ample opportunity to voice in some high-access settings, has apparently carried some weight. While the administration has kept the encryption restrictions in place, it is working to broker a compromise between law enforcement and the high-tech industry, essentially giving Silicon Valley a seat at the table right next to the FBI.

And, while Silicon Valley denizens swear that none of these issues constitutes a litmus test, the smart politician knows that, as with any interest group he or she might be courting, it's best to keep the disagreements on key issues to a minimum. California Senator Barbara Boxer, a longtime ally of the trial lawyers, who only a year ago was a pariah in the Valley because of her dogged opposition to the 1995 securities legislation and her "neutral" stance on 211, has recently become the Valley's darling. In the past year, Boxer, who's counting on the Valley's political and financial support in what's likely to be a tough reelection fight this November, has aligned herself with the Valley on the issues it considers most important: She has cosponsored a bill to deregulate the export of encrypted material; she has fought for an increase in H1-B visas; and, most important, she has abandoned her trial lawyer friends and cosponsored the uniform national standards legislation.

Similarly, Texas Governor George W. Bush had been resolutely neutral on the issue of an Internet tax moratorium. But, in April, only days before what was sure to be his first of many swings through the Valley, Bush abandoned his fellow governors and came out staunchly in favor of a tax-free Internet. The Valley reacted predictably, bestowing on Bush its highest form of praise: "He gets it." In fact, visitors from both parties are increasingly getting it, delivering the same message when they visit the Valley: pro-securities litigation reform, pro-H1-B visas, pro-Internet tax freedom, and anti-encryption restrictions. Marvels one Valley insider: "There's already a Silicon Valley stump speech."

The most frequent deliverers of this stump speech are Democrats. Following Clinton and Gore's lead, a number of New Democrats—with the assistance of Randlett, who, prior to working for TechNet, served as the Democratic Leadership Council's man in California—have tapped the Valley as a crucial base of support. Sensing that Silicon Valley's pro-business, socially moderate, quintessentially centrist politics makes the high-tech executives natural allies, New Democrats have worked overtime to convert the bunch—most of whom were politically agnostic or nominal Republicans only two years ago—to their side. "Outside of the Washington insider crowd, our biggest political constituency is the Silicon Valley," says an aide to a prominent moderate Democrat in the House. "They have the potential to provide political support, and they have the ability to reframe the future. New Democrats are really interested in being a part of that."

That interest is well-founded, as a new generation of Atari—or better yet Netscape—Democrats is being born. TechNet founder Doerr, a registered Republican, is so close with Gore that a favorite joke in the Valley is "Gore-Doerr in 2004." Sandy Robertson, a San Francisco investment banker and until recently a Republican, now raises money for Democratic candidates and is on the board of the DLC. Halsey Minor, the founder of C-Net and a nominal Republican, hosted a DNC fund-raiser last September while Clinton was in the Bay Area dropping off Chelsea at Stanford. All three also contribute to the New Democrat Network, a PAC that supports moderate Democrats in Congress and is heavily backed by other high-tech executives. Moreover, the Valley's twenty- and thirtysomething millionaires—like Marimba's Polese, Netscape's Marc Andreessen, Yahoo's Jerry Yang, Excite's Joe Kraus, and Web-TV's Steve Perlman—are being pulled into the Democratic orbit by their participation in the Gore-Tech meetings. "A thirty-one-year-old CEO hasn't had much political exposure," gripes one Valley Republican, "so hanging out with the vice president can be a pretty head-turning thing."

The Valley has become so identified with Democrats, in fact, that TechNet has had to work especially hard to dispel the notion that it is simply a subsidiary of Gore 2000. The group made Jim Barksdale, the CEO of Netscape, a staunch Republican and old college friend of Trent Lott, its co-director with Doerr; it also hired Schnur to drum up support for Republicans in the Valley. "Clinton and Gore have worked these people better than any other politicians in either party," Schnur says. "The Republicans are making up ground, but we've still got a long way to go."

Schnur is confident that they'll get there. Silicon Valley executives have already bumped heads with traditional Democratic constituencies like the trial lawyers and the teachers' unions, and it's likely they'll anger labor with their new push for H1-B visas. Furthermore, as the high-tech sector grows and becomes a bigger part of the American economy, it's likely that the sector's labor-management equation will change—a change that should help Republicans in the sense that they're the traditional friends of management. Then again, Democrats have been having ever-fewer qualms about befriending management themselves—particularly when friendship has such obvious benefits and the future looks so bright. •

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BOOKS & The Arts

Stanley Kauffmann on Films

Color Lines

Hollywood and politics have been going together for a long time. Kevin Brownlow showed in *Behind the Mask of Innocence* that political comment in American films began much earlier than is generally thought. But Hollywood figures as political activists themselves—that phenomenon began, I'd guess, in the 1930s. One of my fond memories: in the 1936 presidential campaign James Cagney and Robert Montgomery on a pro-Roosevelt radio show singing, to the tune of "The Old Gray Mare," a duet that went "The old red scare, it ain't what it used to be." (Years later both of them became famously conservative.)

Since World War II few stars have been more politically active than Warren Beatty, always on the liberal side. Until now, however, this actor-writer-director-producer has made only one film with overt political content, *Reds*, and for all its revolutionary ambiance, the emphasis there was more on the lives of the principals than on their ideas. Now Beatty presents **Bulworth** (20th Century Fox), in which the politics is more important than the people.

Beatty wrote the original story and co-wrote the screenplay with Jeremy Pikser. The time is 1996. At the start of this comedy-drama, Senator Bulworth of California is running for reelection. But he is depressed and suicidal. He engages a hit man to knock him off during the campaign, after arranging for a $10 million life insurance policy payable to his wife (though relations with her are cool). The policy is payola for a favor to a big insurance company.

While campaigning, Bulworth suddenly becomes a new man. Unexpectedly he begins telling the truth, instead of pumping bilge, and he tells it in sulfurous terms, confessing to poor blacks that they have been betrayed and to rich Jews that they have been fawned on. At a black church he spots a beautiful young woman, Nina, who spots him. An affinity develops between them even as he rushes on in his revisionist campaign.

Partly because of this affinity but mostly because of his liberated conscience, he becomes a white Negro. (This Norman Mailer term was recently the title of a Henry Louis Gates, Jr. article about *Bulworth*.) He begins to speak in rap rhymes. He dresses as a young black man, with a ski-cap on his head. Instead of ruining his electoral chances, these changes spark his campaign and make him a national celebrity. Enlivened, inspirited, he tries desperately to call off the hit he has arranged.

He gets somewhat involved in Nina's family's troubles. All the while he keeps blazing along the campaign trail, rhyming out facts about conditions for American blacks, trying harder and harder to become black. Very near the end, when he tells Nina in the middle of a crowd that they will have difficulty together because of their race difference, she says, "You're my nigger," and they kiss passionately. This, however, is not the end of the picture.

The two recent political films *Wag the Dog* and *Primary Colors* were not really about issues but maneuvers. *Bulworth* steps right into a major issue, and the central metamorphosis is a keen, bitterly comic idea. But the screenplay, for all the care that has obviously gone into it, seems like a first draft. At the main moments of transition in the story, we can almost hear Beatty and friends saying, "We'll fix this later." At the beginning, for instance, Bulworth is sitting in his Washington office, looking at pabulum TV spots of his, apparently a successful, powerful man arranging deals. He does have one brief crying jag, unexplained, but it's hardly enough to explain his wish for assisted suicide. The hit arrangement creaks with unpreparedness. (And, a bit of bad luck for Beatty, a recent Ukrainian film, *A Friend of the Deceased*, uses the same plot device: a man arranges for a hit man to kill him, then tries to call off the deal. In 1990, the device was used in a Finnish film called *I Hired a Contract Killer*.)

Mrs. Bulworth's behavior in public and private is hard to believe. Candidates' wives don't often upbraid their husbands in front of others for being late. And the likelihood seems dim that such a wife, in the middle of a campaign, would have an affair, in these days when investigative reporters are drooling with rapacity.

Then there is Bulworth's transformation. It is simply not adequately motivated. When it happens, it seems quite arbitrary, making us aware of plot mechanics instead of filling us with admiration. It is just as contrived as the contract on his life.

What's even worse is the way his trans-

FILMS WORTH SEEING

Healing by Killing. *A documentary featuring interviews with survivors and perpetrators of the Nazi sterilization and euthanasia program. A small but worthy appendix to* Shoah. *(Reviewed 5/25/98)* **Marius and Jeannette.** *A working-class love story set in Marseilles today but with the atmosphere of a 1930s French film. Some sentimentality but much good sentiment. (5/4/98)* **Wild Man Blues.** *Woody Allen is more interesting than usual in this documentary about his European tour with a jazz band. (5/11/98)* **Wilde.** *The life and trials of Oscar—much of them, anyway. The change in social acceptance of homosexuality in recent years gives the story a new perspective. The cast, especially Stephen Fry as Wilde, is first-class. (5/18/98)*—**SK**

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THE Reader's PAGE.

THE MUSIC OF LIGHT

by Lindsley Cameron

Much of Kenzaburo Oe's Nobel Prize-winning writing is inspired by his son, Hikari, who, though severely brain damaged, has a savant-like gift for music composition and recollection that borders on genius. *The Music of Light* is their extraordinary story. (The Free Press)

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WILLIAM STYRON: A LIFE

by James L. West III

James West gives us a biography of an American writer with a worldly soul. William Styron has always chosen his subjects without fear, from slavery (*The Confessions of Nat Turner*) to the Holocaust (*Sophie's Choice*) to his own battle with depression (*Darkness Visible*). (Random House)



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When she was just seventeen, and before she wrote *Little Women*, Louisa May Alcott wrote *The Inheritance*, a sentimental tale of a charming orphan. This book gives us the rare opportunity to witness the evolution of, and discover a new book by, a classic author. (Penguin Classics)

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

—Benjamin Disraeli

CLEMENT GREENBERG: A LIFE

by Florence Rubenfeld

Responsible for the rise of Pollock and De Kooning, among others, Clement Greenberg's opinions on art had an incomparable impact that still reverberates. Florence Rubenfeld's biography assesses the man and the New York art scene he helped create. (Scribner)



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by Donald Rayfield

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

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

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

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WITHOUT LYING DOWN

by Cari Beauchamp

Frances Marion defied convention and defined early Hollywood. *Without Lying Down* is the story of how she paved her own way and became the highest paid screenwriter for four decades (writing over 200 films and receiving Academy Awards for *The Champ* and *The Big House*). (University of California Press)



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

—George Sand

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formation is received. When it happens, his aides are naturally appalled; but the media and the public respond with huzzahs. This is sheer farce carpentry, on a different plane from the gravity of Bulworth's utterances, especially since his language on TV is laced with words that no network would, as yet, carry.

All these structural gaffes are doubly regrettable: they could have been fixed, and they seriously hurt a film of admirable purpose. Beatty wants to blast us with some facts about race in this country: despite the black sports stars and mayors and professors and lawyers that we know about, most African Americans live *outside*. Rap music is anger music, hate music. Social and political programs can help, have helped, but the real program has to be internal—within white people. Bulworth, slightly crazed, is trying to dramatize this basic truth in his very being. But his story's structure impedes him.

Christine Baranski, as Mrs. Bulworth, is her usual valuable self, pungent and unique. Nina is the exquisite Halle Berry, every bit as persuasive as she needs to be. Jack Warden as an old pol, Paul Sorvino as a tycoon lobbyist, Oliver Platt as Bulworth's right hand, are all reliable craftsmen, always welcome. In *Reds* Beatty used a well-known author, Jerzy Kosinski, to play Zinoviev; here he uses a well-known author, Amiri Baraka, to play a ragged homeless man who recurs like the soothsayer in *Julius Caesar*. (Baraka has the last line of the film, something cloudy about being a spirit, not a ghost.)

Beatty himself is high wattage, revved up, sharp in his comic timing, gleaming with eagerness to put his film across. As director, he carries on from where he left off in *Reds*; he is sure and fluent, and occasionally he tips his hat to the past. In *Reds* he paid his respects to Eisenstein; here it's to Capra. In the middle of one of Bulworth's revolutionary talks, the electric power is suddenly switched off to isolate him, which is what happened to Gary Cooper in *Meet John Doe*. (Capra's grandson was a co-producer on *Bulworth* and doubtless appreciated the homage.)

A pity that the contrivances of the structure nag at the truths in the film. It is especially painful because this is clearly a crux in Beatty's life. *Bulworth* is to Beatty very much what Bulworth's conversion is to him, a chance to revitalize his career. Beatty has faded in the last decade, partly because of inactivity, partly because of his last film, *Love Affair*, a remake of a 1939 weepie that even I couldn't drive myself to see. *Bulworth* could have gone far to reestablish him. Well, it may go far, anyway, because a good deal of it is politically sound and theatrically glittering. •

Manly Agitations

By Richard Poirier

Gertrude Stein: Writings 1903-1932

(Library of America, 941 pp., $40)

Gertrude Stein: Writings 1932-1946

(Library of America, 844 pp., $40)

edited by Catharine R. Stimpson and Harriet Chessman

Well before her death in Paris in 1946 at the age of 72, Gertrude Stein had elevated herself to the ranks of the immortals. "Think of the Bible and Homer think of Shakespeare and think of me," she instructs in *The Geographical History of America*, written in 1935. She might have thought it a bit tardy that not until now, with these two volumes, has she entered the Library of America; but as she also once said, "history takes time," and she might want to conclude that the Library had waited till she could occupy a sort of pinnacle, though no such thing was intended.

The Stein volumes bring the series to a full one hundred, and at a point when the century—in which it was a "woman," meaning herself, who "did the important literary thinking"—is about to pass into a new millennium. The volumes amount to close to 2,000 pages, making this the most comprehensive collection of her writings ever published. Even so, some of her work had to be omitted, such as her massive *The Making of Americans* (written between 1903 and 1911 and published in 1925), a novel that has been compared in scope and achievement to *Ulysses* and *A la recherche du temps perdu*. A recent printing of it by Dalkey Archive Press weighs in at over 900 crowded pages.

Along with an abundance of her works, these volumes assemble a full chronology of Stein's life and notes on each of the texts, along with essential information about dates of composition—important in her case, because the dates of publication can be years or decades later. And there are notes for words and phrases that would likely send readers to a dictionary but which would not easily be found there. No interpretive notes are allowed in Library of America volumes, and it is a policy especially appropriate for a writer who tends not only to avoid allusions or big words, but to insist that each of her readers be allowed the freest play of response to her arrangements of words, which are often intentionally meant to be puzzling. The final selection was left to two well-seasoned scholars of her work, Catharine R. Stimpson, one of Stein's most acute and essential interpreters, and Harriet Chessman, the author of an instructive book on Stein called *The Public is Invited to the Dance*.

The public is invited to the dance: taken from the subtitle of one of Stein's poems, Chessman's title might reassure readers otherwise shy of getting close to the writings of "one of modernism's hardest writers," as Stimpson has called her. Any writer famous for being "hard"—Stein or Pound, Stevens, Joyce or Eliot—is usually thought to be so immensely self-assured as to be indifferent to the approval or disapproval of the puzzled reader. If you don't get it, it's because you don't get it. This has the unfortunate consequence that the intimidated reader is likely to miss the evidence lurking in these modernist works of the intensely conflicted feelings that can infiltrate them, no matter how aloof the writer pretends to be.

The more one reads of Stein over the course of her long career, the more she seems in fact to be genuinely torn between an impulse to write for the general public and the conviction that she should be writing only for herself. It is not enough, as she once hauntingly phrased it in *The Making of Americans*, that "I write for myself and strangers." Finally it must be only "for myself." With other American writers, such as Melville or Whitman or Frost, she seems in this, as in many other respects, to be working

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in a tradition of difficulty naggingly troubled by the fact that the writing emerges from and returns to a democratic culture.

Stein was by nature a gregarious, immensely personable woman, who could charm not only the world's great but also nearly anonymous persons, like the garage mechanics who fixed her car when she and Alice B. Toklas drove around France making themselves useful during World War I, or the city employees in her Parisian neighborhood from whom she wheedled extra rations of fuel during a coal strike, or the students who flocked to her lectures in England and in the United States, or especially the American G.I.'s whose voices (and post-war concerns) she catches so sympathetically in *Brewsie and Willy* (1945), and who swarmed about her when she visited them in occupied Germany after World War II. She and Toklas had spent the war hiding in the villages of Belignin and Culoz, towns in Vichy France, and their Paris apartment, with its precious collection of modernist paintings, intruded upon only once by German soldiers, who took only a few trinkets. These two middle-aged Jewish American women living in hostage to wartime enemies of their people and their country were made safe, it seems, by the interventions of an influential friend of theirs and of Picasso's, named Bernard Fay, a scholar of American history and culture and an advisor during the war to Marshal Pétain. After the war, he was sentenced to prison for life as a collaborator.

All the while, Stein ardently believed that true "writing" had no resemblance whatever to social discourse, even though she was manifestly successful at it. "When I write I write and when I talk I talk," she wrote in the very talky *Everybody's Autobiography* (1936), "and the two are not one." "Talking," she writes at this same time, in "What Are Master-pieces and Why Are There So Few of Them," "has nothing to do with creating." Talking is always with or to someone; it is perforce in the language of the "outside," while writing, for her, was ideally only of and from the "inside," a foreign language to the "outside."

Stein's quite elaborate cartographies of the writing self should not be treated, as they sometimes too solemnly are, as indispensable clues to her writings, or as a dependable scale on which to rank them. They are improvisations, of a kind familiar enough among writers who have longings for immortality more than earthly ambitions. Such schemes help them to explain why some of their best writings appear to them to have come

Martin Heidegger

BETWEEN GOOD AND EVIL

Rüdiger Safranski

TRANSLATED BY EWALD OSERS

One of the century's greatest philosophers, Martin Heidegger was also a man of great failures and flaws, a Faustus who made a pact with the devil of his time, Adolf Hitler. The story of Heidegger's life and philosophy is told in this brilliant biography. A chronicle of ideas and of personal commitments and betrayals, Safranski's biography combines clear accounts of the philosophy that won Heidegger eternal renown with the fascinating details of the loves and lapses that tripped up this powerful intellectual. Written by a master of Heidegger's philosophy, the book is one of the best introductions to the thought and to the life of Heidegger.

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

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

MAN IS WOLF TO MAN
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from someone or somewhere else, and are therefore markedly different from their writings that manage or are intended to be popular. It is a way to account for writings that may seem literally extraordinary. Such categories of style, and of the different parts of the self that presumably correspond to them, may shape the speech of certain characters in a work such as Ahab, or Richard II, who, both a man and a king by divine right, says of himself: "Thus play I in one person many people."

Claims to multiple identity were made also by two American writers who were particular favorites of Stein's, along with Henry James. There was Emerson, with his famous depiction of "double consciousness," wherein the "two lives, of the understanding and the soul, which we lead, really show very little relation to each other ... one prevails now, all buzz and din; the other prevails then, all infinitude and paradise." And there was Whitman, who goes Emerson one better, imagining for himself a tripartite arrangement whereby a "real Me" keeps its distance from, and is capable of being quite scornfully judgmental of, "my self" and "my soul." I evoke these precedents to emphasize that Stein likes firmly to locate herself within an American literary tradition. Her experimental writings should therefore be regarded not as beyond the tolerable limits of what an American experimental tradition encourages, but as an extreme development that significantly, importantly reflects back upon it.

GERTRUDE STEIN BY JACK COUGHLIN FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC

Coming late to the invention of these terminological divides, Stein understandably embellishes them. Divisions already overelaborated by Whitman are elaborated still further. The core distinction laid down in *The Geographical History* goes something like this: "the human mind," which is timeless, the shared property through the ages of various writers of genius, is utterly detached from "human nature," which is historically determined and changeable, and from which sexual and racial identifications emanate.

This dualism is then exemplified by attendant ones having more directly to do with writing. These are anticipated in earlier works such as *The Making of Americans*, and they become more programmatically active in her writing thereafter. There is, for instance "true writing" (an emanation of "mind") as against "writing" or "speech" (which are endorsed by "human nature" and by the social commonality). There is also "entity writing" (as from "mind") opposed to "identity writing" (derived from "human nature" and content with words that have already been "identified" with things as they are). Finally there is the distinction laid down in "What Is English Literature," one of her *Lectures in America*, as between "writing to serve God" or "writing to serve Mammon," though this tends to get blurred by her casually letting the two be separated now and then not by "or" but by "and." Why not, indeed, write for both at once?

Even though the wording of Stein's classifications might suggest that works presumably written for God are necessarily superior to works meant to serve Mammon, critical estimates of that sort turn out to be crude or useless. There is abundant evidence, for example, that she intended *Stanzas in Meditation* to be taken as a sharp and disparaging contrast to *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*. She wrote them more or less concurrently in 1932-33, the latter destined to be her most popular and profitable book, the former among her most inaccessible, intended presumably as an act of penance for her efforts at selling out. But her intention in no way proves in the actual results that the harder book is superior to the easier one, though this is a familiar misconception in academic assessments of Stein and most writers of the early modernist period. Even some of Stein's most assiduous readers are heard to say that the *Autobiography*, precisely because of its popularity, is an obstruction to a serious appreciation of her.

It is not to be taken for granted that Stein is at her best or even at her most representative in works that are close to impenetrable, such as the nonetheless important *Patriarchal Poetry* (written in 1927 but not published until 1953). Not only is the line between her more public writings and her more private writings a blurred one in many important instances, it is a line that gradually becomes indistinct the more closely acquainted one gets with some very difficult works, notably *Tender Buttons*, which appeared in 1914. That work is divided into three sections, "Objects," "Food," and "Rooms." Except for "Rooms," these sections are then broken down into smaller pieces carrying titles like "A Piece of Coffee" or "Roast Potatoes," followed by what purport to be descriptions. Yet the descriptions are totally defamiliarizing, and they are given in words that seem only tenuously related to one another. It is left to the reader to work toward a wholly new awareness of names and things.

A reader who wants to enter into the movements of Stein's language had best read her without caring too strictly about any of her various schematizations of private as against public writing. It is better to think of each piece, particularly when it is experimental to one degree or another, as constituting a scene in

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the dramatization of her degrees of estrangement from normative English. There is scarcely any work of hers, including the more conventional ones, that is not to some extent an act of linguistic protest against traditional and agreed-upon systems of designation and the structures of relative primacy and subordination that have been made to seem necessary, normal, and inevitable.

That Stein's writing is often anomalous is in part a reflection of the fact that she is herself an anomaly, in the sense of that term that Catharine Stimpson ascribes to the anthropologist Mary Gordon. Every culture, according to Gordon, explains itself to itself through categories that are endorsed by general public acceptance and usage:

> [These categories] cannot easily . . . be subject to revision. Yet they cannot reject the challenge of aberrant forms. Any given system of classification must give rise to anomalies, and any given culture must confront events which seem to defy its assumptions. It cannot ignore the anomalies which it produces.

Stein is an anomaly not because she is a woman writer, but because she is a woman writer who assigns herself the role of peer of the greatest literary geniuses, and these are, in her lists of them, always male.

Similarly, while celebrating her lesbianism, she imagines, especially in her experimental writings, that her natural sexual position is the classic male position in heterosexual sex. She is, in her own words, "on top." Being thus one of the grand masters of writing she is also a master in love, and she often readily identifies herself in either case as a man. As she puts it mischievously in her poem "Lifting Belly," written in 1915-17:

> Lifting belly can please me because it is
> an occupation I enjoy.
> Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.
> In print on top.

A declaration of literary mastery, this is also an exhibition of it. Stein's signature line about "Rose" as a rose had appeared earlier, in 1913, in "Sacred Emily," and it would be repeated in more than a dozen of her works, culminating in *The World is Round*, her highly successful children's book of 1938, whose hero is named Rose and which in its first edition, was, as one evidence of Stein's often childlike insistence, printed on rose-colored paper and illustrated by Sir Francis Rose, while displaying on the cover a circle made up of "Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose."

Toklas, it is reported in the *Autobiography*, put the line "as a device on the letter paper, on the table linen and anywhere that [Stein] would permit it that I would put it." It became a device on Stein's signet ring, used for the sealing wax on addressed envelopes. It was, in effect, Stein's logo. Along the way, however, she quietly altered it, so that the initial "Rose," a woman's name, emerges instead in lower case as "a rose," referring thereby not to a woman, but to a flower and to the word itself. It is a word or a flower, no more than that, and by being compared only to itself it is, she thinks, thereby divested of the many significances that it has acquired from its poetic appearances over many centuries. That is how she herself chose to interpret the line, when, in 1936, she said to Thornton Wilder, as he later reported: "Now listen! I'm no fool. I know that in daily life we don't go around saying 'is a . . . is a . . . is a. . . .' Yes, I'm no fool; but I think that in that line the rose is red for the first time in English poetry for a hundred years."

But what about that line when she chose originally to print it as if "rose" were meant to describe some property of a woman named Rose? In that version of the line—and in its variant, regardless of Stein's intentions—the rapid repetition of "a rose" easily slips into a pun on

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

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

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"eros," especially when she arranges the words in a circle. The pun can be found also in Melville's poetry, when he plays on "rose" and "a-maroso." These erotic connotations of "a rose" are strongly hinted at in one of Touchstone's ribald speeches in *As You Like It*, Stein's favorite play of Shakespeare's, which is alluded to in *The World Is Round*. He there uses "rose," as in Rosalind, to refer to the heroine's vagina, as it also does, inferentially, in Dante's *Vita Nuova*. Thus if the line is supposed to be read in one version as an act of poetic de-creation and cleansing, it is in an earlier version, which was to resurface in *The World is Round*, invested with some of the most ancient associations acquired from the poetry of the past, associations which haunt Stein's line in all its versions.

Thus, while the line as it appears in "Lifting Belly," and as it first appeared in "Sacred Emily," is unmistakably metaphoric, linking a person to a flower, the revised version, which was soon to follow and to predominate thereafter, is meant, regardless of the impossibility of doing so, to nullify any metaphoricity. That was Stein's intention; but it cannot be realized. It can be no more than gestural. Stein was fully aware of this problem, and she never let it deter her freedom of movement. Any theories that she might entertain about her role as the redeemer of language give way in practice to her larger conviction that, as a master of poetry, she is free to do whatever she wants to do with language, and that includes using it conventionally. She can disassociate a word from its acquired significances, which is sometimes all she is credited with wanting to achieve, and she can also, at her convenience, revive and deploy those same associations with the same word.

Stein has theories about many things, but her theory of herself as a grand master in print and in bed is the mother of all her theories. As a master of language, she is "on top," just as she is "on top" with Toklas: she is a usurper who, in the very process of eradicating patriarchal structures in sex and in sentences, also reserves to herself the privileges derived from those structures. She is a "man" in relation to other women; she is a "man" in a line entirely of male geniuses; and like her two American favorites in that line, she makes self-contradiction into an evidence of her absolute authority over words. "With consistency a great soul has absolutely nothing to do," said Emerson, then to be echoed by Whitman: "Do I contradict myself? / Very well then I contradict myself, (I am large, I contain multitudes)."

Stein's seemingly outrageous claims to preeminence and all-inclusiveness manage to charm rather than to offend, in part because the claims are characteristically phrased in a way that depersonalizes them. It is as if she is claiming superiority not for herself as an individual, but for something much larger and more inclusive, something belonging to "the human mind," as it does to Emerson's "oversoul." Take, for example, the exhortation that when we think of her we think only of the great, indeed the greatest: "Think of Homer and the Bible think of Shakespeare and think of me." She is speaking less on her own behalf than on behalf of an idea that genius in writing is an expression ideally only of the human mind which is timeless, not the property of any individual who participates in it. That "mind," besides, is indifferent to individual identity, including sexual identity, which emanates from "human nature."

Appropriately and shrewdly, it turns out that Stein's sentence refers to works of literature whose authorship has in each case been in dispute for centuries. This in itself might suggest that there is a general resistance to the idea that works of genius can ever be convincingly attributed only to specific individuals. Homer, birthplace unknown and blind, has had his authorship of the *Iliad*, and, even more frequently of the *Odyssey*, cast into doubt. Shakespeare's plays, as in a couple of recently published books, have with some frequency been attributed to the Earl of Oxford, and in the later nineteenth century, during which Stein reached her twenties, the claim of Bacon to their authorship was taken seriously by, among others, Whitman. As for the Bible, who can be sure who wrote any part of it? Growing up in a Jewish family, Stein is likely to have heard the Torah ascribed to Moses. Thus, even as Stein elevates herself to this select group, the authorial identity of each of them is forever a matter of dispute.

Stein nullifies any fixed identification between the writer and the writing; and this brings up a central question about the importance to her own writing, especially in its experimental phase, of gender identification and lesbian identity. Her lesbian sexuality is important to her writing from the very outset, as is evident in the first of her novels, *Q.E.D.*, which was written in 1903 but left untyped and unpublished until after her death. Awkwardly anxious to be conventional in form and in style, *Q.E.D.* has at its center three young women who are involved in an unhappy triangulated love affair. The three have been identified as Stein,

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who in the novel is called Adele, and two of the friends she made while studying at Johns Hopkins: the lover, Helen, is May Bookstaver, who was to remain close to Stein all her life, and the other woman, called Mabel Neathe in the novel, in love with Helen and Adele's rival, is Mabel Haynes.

Several good reasons can be imagined why Stein relegated this novel to her unsorted manuscripts, where Toklas and a few other of her friends happened upon it in 1932. One likely reason was Stein's apprehension that the three characters involved would be identified with living persons, embarrassing all of them, particularly the two who were soon to find husbands. But this possibility of recognition points to a better and more strictly literary reason for her neglect of the novel. At the time she wrote it, Stein had yet to find a way to transform the material taken from her sexual life into anything much beyond a vague recounting of it. She had not yet discovered and developed the necessary resourcefulness in language that would allow her to discover connections between her unconventional practices in love and the correspondingly unconventional forms which her writing was waiting to take.

She was not long in finding ways to do so. In the meantime, *Q.E.D.* did little more than reveal that her clumsily conventional writing was matched by what was then her clumsy, inexperienced, and reticent sexuality—deficiencies that the outspoken May Bookstaver was quite ready to point out to her. She was illiterate in the language of the body, and would remain so until Toklas came into her life in Paris in 1907. At the very end of her first portrait of Toklas, a piece called "Ada" written in 1910, Stein lyrically and movingly expresses what Toklas meant to her in those first years:

> Trembling was all living, living was all loving, some one was then the other one. Certainly this one was loving this Ada then. And certainly Ada all her living then was happier in living than any one else who ever could, who was, who is, who ever will be living.

"Living" in the Stein-Toklas household was not to be "all loving" once Toklas discovered and read *Q.E.D.* in 1932. This was at a time when Stein was finishing the *Autobiography* and was hard at work on *Stanzas in Meditation.* As it turned out, Stein had neglected to mention the May Bookstaver episode when, on pledging themselves to each other, she and Toklas were supposed to have confessed to all previous love affairs.

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

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

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Toklas took this as a betrayal of trust, the more embarrassing because she was obliged to cooperate with Bookstaver in efforts to secure the publication of *The Making of Americans*. It was while doing research years later on *The Making of Americans* that the Stein scholar Leon Katz unearthed the affair between Stein and Bookstaver; and it was to him that Toklas admitted, in 1952-53, that she had gone so far as to force Stein to destroy all the letters that Bookstaver had written her in the early years.

More than that, and coming close upon the revelations involving May Bookstaver, Toklas, while typing the new work in progress, *Stanzas in Meditation*, became suspicious of the frequent appearance in it of the word "may." She was not being in the least paranoid, it seems to me, funny though the whole episode may now seem. In fact, the word "may" is peculiarly recurrent, especially when concentrated, as it sometimes is, over the short space of several consecutive lines. Toklas persuaded herself that this was Stein's covert way of evoking the name of her first lover, whose identity had not before been made known to Toklas. Accordingly, she began marking these recurrences, occasionally writing "May" in the margin, and at one point typing "May B." close to Stein's "maybe." Stein got the message, and set about changing many, but not all, uses of "may" to alternative words. She usually substituted "can," but in a few cases "and" or "are." References to the month of May became references to April or to "month-to-day."

That these revisions often have absurd results does not at all prove that Toklas's suspicions were groundless. Most likely, she was on to something actually at work in the language of the poem. Quite conspicuously so, I think, in passages such as the one I will presently quote, which begins with a declaration (and a solicitation) of love, one that Toklas could normally take as directed only to herself. The two lines are startlingly clear, the more so in a poem of such sustained obscurity, but they are followed by a repetition of "may," in three of the next eight lines, so insistent and yet so unrelated to any other words around it, that "may" is made to seem all the more like a calling out to a missing presence:

> Tell me darling tell me true
> Am I all the world to you
> And the world of what does it consist
>
> May they be a chance to may they be
> desist. . . .
> May they come with may they in with
> For which they may need needing

But however just were Toklas's complaints, the revisions made in response to them can have no compelling textual authority. So while the version of the poem as first published in its entirety in 1950, and in subsequent printings, is the version from which the offending "may" has been banished, scholarly research undertaken by Ulla Dydo has persuasively demonstrated that "may" should be restored to the place Stein had originally given it. (This is done in the Library of America printing, which uses as a text the corrected typescript that does not include revisions to the word "may" and which can be found in the Beinecke Library at Yale.)

Stein's depictions of lesbian sexuality are most purposefully and playfully intended, I think, when they are made nearly indistinguishable from her violations of linguistic regularity. Her personal presence is especially strong in her writing at points when she is, so to speak, in the process of discovering that her delight in the female body is not distinguishable from the pleasures that she finds in the twisting of syntax and individual words out of their normal or customary shapes. Either activity is for her—and for us, she hopes, as we are reading her—a liberation from conformity to patriarchal assumptions.

The first evidence of these ambitious purposes begins to appear in "Melanctha," written in 1905, a scant two years after the failed effort of *Q.E.D.* The principal story in *Three Lives*, "Melanctha" is also one of the most enduring works of short fiction written at the start of a century that was to witness some consummate achievements in that form. Escaping from the brutish authority of a father who seems intent on abusing her sexually, Melanctha finds temporary solace in her friendship with the more sexually knowing but untrustworthy Rose. When, in the earlier stages of their association, the two young women feel exceptionally close to one another and can manage to be alone, Stein's gradually intensifying synchronizations of their speech rhythms and their vocabulary can be brought to a pitch, as are some similar exchanges later on in the story between Melanctha and her lover Jeff, that amazingly evokes, without any direct reference to them, the accelerations of bodily movement as two people are reaching together a point of sexual climax.

The story is in every respect a triumph, and yet it is not considered one of her "experimental" works to the degree that *Tender Buttons* is, written about seven years later. The reason, perhaps, is that in "Melanctha," for all its success in the rendering of lesbian sexuality, there is no recognition of the identifications that Stein elsewhere makes between irregular sexual practice and the irregular deployment of words.

But *Tender Buttons* is designed both to confirm such an identification, and to induce the reader to discover it by his own interpretive concentrations on the words. Consider a witty and audacious example, a short entry that appears in *Tender Buttons* under the heading "Objects":

> A cutlet.
> A blind agitation is manly and uttermost.

Following the title, the sentence seems wholly comfortable in its own oddity. And why should it not be? Its vocabulary is simple enough, its tone is concise and authoritative, despite the fact that the details soon begin to seem ever more peculiar in relation to one another. So while it sounds as if Stein fully expects to be understood, we soon recognize that to arrive at any understanding of the sentence or its title will require a patient and prolonged involvement in syntactical arrangements that defamiliarize words otherwise easily grasped. The sentence is not in the least portentous, and even as she is rejecting conventional syntax, Stein invites us to enjoy with her the unfolding of alternatives to it. As she will later enjoin us in *Patriarchal Poetry*,

> Reject rejoice rejuvenate rejuvenate rejoice
> reject rejoice
> rejuvenate reject rejuvenate reject rejoice.
> Not as if it
> was tried.

Clearly *Tender Buttons* asks us to try. To be told straight off that "a cutlet" is for some reason "a blind agitation," only confirms that it is not a slice of chicken or veal, which is evident enough already, since "A cutlet" is not printed under the heading reserved for "Food." The title does not appear to exert any authority in determining the order of words in the sentence that follows and presumably describes or modifies it. The order given those words, rather, is wholly arbitrary, free-floating in relation not only to the title but to one another. What is or might be "a blind agitation"? By asking the question at all, the reader is assenting to Stein's right once again to do with words anything she is of a mind to do with them, and agreeing also that she might well be making a kind of sense in her wholly unfamiliar arrangements.

To say that an "agitation" is "blind" may mean that it is not able to make visible, or otherwise identify, its source.

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Such often proves to be the case with "agitation." Maybe it is "blind" also because the "agitation" is felt at a spot where it can be self-generated or caused by an instrument, such as a hand, that blindly gropes at and stimulates the spot. All good enough possibilities, but not much to go on as we proceed, in the order given, to the word "manly." Still, if it is Stein's mission to reject forms which are overdetermining, then that must include forms into which her own words have fallen. We are free, then, to skip the word "manly" for a moment and to look ahead to the word "uttermost."

From its very sound the coinage seems more susceptible to interpretation than the word "manly." "Uttermost" sounds, that is, like a word that will readily yield a number of puns, such as "most utterable." There could also be an intended pun on "utter" as "outer most," a hint that this "blind agitation" may be occurring on or near the outer edge of something, perhaps some part of the body, or even that the agitation results in a projection at such an edge. Moreover, there is a likelihood that "utter" is a pun on "udder," as is more obviously the case later on in *Tender Buttons*, where the word "utter" will resurface under the title "Milk."

Let us say, then, that "a blind agitation" is "manly" because it is taking place at some "uttermost" (that is outermost and uddermost) part of a woman's body, at the site, for example, of an erect clitoris, the female equivalent to a male phallus. Thus "manly agitation," coming either from a man or from a woman, may produce not only an erection, but a milky excretion. Most simply, "a cutlet" becomes a metaphor for the vaginal gap, itself a small "cut" or "cutlet."

Some readers by now have come to feel that this metaphorical equation is so inevitable that we ought to have been aware of it from the outset. This is in itself one evidence that *Tender Buttons*, even while being a resolutely experimental and difficult work, is less radically so than are some later ones, such as *Stanzas in Meditation*, where words seem deliberately estranged from one another and to become objects unto themselves. By contrast, Stein is committed in this earlier work to what she calls, in *Lectures in America*, the "recreation" of words. This means that she is intent on discovering meanings already lurking in them, but in such a suppressed way that they can be released only by her genius at putting some words into wholly unexpected juxtaposition to other words.

That the *Oxford English Dictionary* never attributes to the word "cutlet" the meaning Stein finds in it does not prove that the word had not at some point in the past carried that meaning. Indeed, in Melville's story "Bartleby, the Scrivener," as it first appeared in *Putnam's Monthly* in 1853, the "grub-man" at the Tombs, where Bartleby has been confined as a vagrant, is named Mr. Cutlets. Induced by a bribe to make himself "useful" to Bartleby, he accordingly approaches him with a proposal: "May Mrs. Cutlets and I have the pleasure of your company to dinner, sir, in Mrs. Cutlets' private room?" The innuendo was thought so obvious, and perhaps so offensive to some readers, that either Melville or his editors deleted both the name "Cutlets" and the reference to her "private room" when the story appeared in *Piazza Tales* in 1856.

To discover by interpretation that Stein is using the word "cutlet" the way Melville had used it half a century earlier is not, then, to discover her originality. Her originality consists in her ability to make that meaning serve her decidedly particular intentions. By her own "manly agitations" of the normative forms of English, Stein manages even in so brief a piece to affirm—as does her love-making with "Pussy," her pet name for Toklas, on which she also likes to pun—that the potentialities of vaginal power are equivalent, in projectile and productive ways, to the male phallus, a standard sign of patriarchal dominance. That dominance, inscribed in the customary structures of language, as in the relation of substantives to other merely supportive units, is subverted by Stein's wordplay. And this subversion is undertaken so that she may in the process appropriate patriarchal power to herself and in a form of her own devising.

The term "patriarchal" has become a buzz-word in literary and psychoanalytic theory; and Stein would have known of equivalents to some of these theories, in theories picked up from her reading of Emerson and especially William James. Emerson's essays everywhere insist on one absolutely essential responsibility for any serious writer: to resist in his or her language those conformities that are the price of using words to mean only what one's audience insists that they should mean. At times he is close to saying that the best, perhaps the only way to do this, is to keep your mouth shut. "As soon as he has once acted or spoken with eclat," he warns in "Self-Reliance," "he is a committed person." That is, he is sentenced to a jail house of conformity made out of his own sentences, particularly sentences designed easily to be understood.

As a result, Emerson's language in the essays, notably at points in "Self-Reliance," can be nearly as difficult to negotiate as Stein's. At other times, even silence is said to be preferable to speech. "Good as discourse is, silence is better and shames it." "If I speak," he says in still another essay, "I define, I confine, and am less." And even if one manages to remain silent, it then turns out that, so far as Emerson is concerned, "Every thought is also a prison." Why should this be so? Because a "thought" is the inert, frozen product of the activity of "thinking," framed in words that cannot exclusively be one's own.

A more direct influence on Stein's attitudes toward language came from William James. He was her favorite teacher at Harvard Annex, soon to be called Radcliffe College, where she enrolled in 1893. In 1894, James invited her to join his seminar. She was already acquainted with his writings, especially with *Principles of Psychology*, published only a few years earlier in 1891, a book widely discussed over the next few years among faculty and students at Harvard. After leaving there, she kept in touch with James while studying psychology and medicine, on his recommendation, at Johns Hopkins, and after that, when she had settled in Paris. In 1908, two years before his death, he visited the apartment on the rue du Fleurus which she then shared with her brilliant and domineering brother Leo. This was before Toklas arrived in 1910, soon to displace him. James looked at the paintings that the Steins had accumulated, including works by Cézanne, Matisse, and Picasso: "I told you," he said. "I told you that you would keep your mind open."

The clearest, most simply stated evidence of James's importance to Stein's experimental uses of language can be found in the chapter of *Principles* called "The Stream of Thought." It is there that James observes that "language works against our perceptions of the truth." He has in mind two closely related features of ordinary language use. First, the way in which we tend spontaneously to name things as their presence registers on consciousness: "so that the names are taken as previous and explanatory." In this way we suppress the actual experience of these things, which occurs within a coincidental jumble of many other impressions and feelings. Second, he is referring to the manner in which we have come, as if instinctively, to build or structure the sentences we ordinarily use.

According to James, we have learned to accept as both natural and inevitable the privileges normally given in sentences to substantives, to names, or to

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designated subjects. That is, we are made craven before "power bringing words," as he will derisively refer to them in *Pragmatism*, such as "God" or "Reality" or "Truth." These ingrained habits of naming and of structuring things have had brutal and brutalizing consequences on our thinking. With considerable feeling, James observes that

> so inveterate has our habit become of recognizing the existence of the substantive parts alone, that language almost refuses to lend itself to any other use ... All *dumb* or anonymous psychic states have, owing to this error, been coolly suppressed; or, if recognized at all, have been named after the substantive perception they led to, as thoughts "about" this object or "about" that, the stolid word *about* engulfing all their delicate idiosyncrasies in its monotonous sound.

Those are impassioned words, delivered in a tone of outrage; and so it is important to note that James is not speaking out on behalf of people who have been marginalized, suppressed, made inarticulate and anonymous, by oppressive systems. What outrages him are the beleaguered elements in an ordinary sentence, those parts of the sentence whose presence is diminished or silenced by the dominant syntactical forms that "engulf" them, along with certain of our "psychic states." Stein is equally concerned about such matters, though in an altogether lighter tone, as in *Lectures in America*, when she talks about "the active life of writing." She has developed on the way a fondness for verbs because "they are, so to speak, on the move and adverbs move with them." She especially likes prepositions, which "can live one long life being really being nothing." And though for a while she had trouble liking or even using nouns, the equivalent of James's "substantives," she gradually found ways "to refuse them by using them." It was then that "my real acquaintance with poetry was begun," she reports.

The reason is that "poetry is concerned with using with abusing, with losing with wanting, with avoiding with adoring with replacing the noun." This is very like a relationship between lovers trying to find their balance, or between rivals testing their relative strength. Language and the writer, that is, are to be thought of as antagonists in an ongoing drama, an unceasing and active struggle by each side against merely being "used" by the other.

RICHARD POIRIER is Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Library of America and editor of *Raritan Quarterly*.

Out of the Past

BY ISTVAN DEAK

Kosovo: A Short History by Noel Malcolm

(New York University Press, 492 pp., $28.95)

Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo by Miranda Vickers

(Columbia University Press, 328 pp., $18.95)

Scarcely more than a few Americans had ever heard of Kosovo until recently, but chances now are that Kosovo will become a household name, since the problems of this province, one of Europe's unhappiest and poorest regions, are so appalling as to require international intervention. These two books will contribute mightily to making Kosovo better understood. Noel Malcolm concentrates on the early history, while Miranda Vickers devotes more than half of her study to post-World War II developments. Neither book is particularly easy to read—Vickers's book is especially weighed down by a mass of names, data, and other details, and it contains only two small maps, as if she expects the reader to know where Bujan, Decani, Gracanica, Djakovica, Tetovo, and Novi Pazar are located—and neither book offers simple explanations of the complex problems they describe. But both are majestic, all-embracing histories, and they arrive not a moment too soon.

Kosovo is a province in the Serbian Republic. The Serbian Republic is the major component of today's Yugoslavia, the minor component being Montenegro. Kosovo borders on Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, and Macedonia, and it counts nearly one and a half million inhabitants. Eighty-five percent of them are Albanian-speakers, nearly nine percent are Serbs and Montenegrins, and the rest are Slavic-speaking Muslims, Turks, Roma (Gypsies), Vlachs, Circassians, and others. In terms of religious identification, which in this region is at least as important as ethnicity, Albanian-speakers are mostly Muslims with a small minority of Catholics, while Serbs and Montenegrins are adherents of Eastern Orthodoxy.

It is not always easy to say precisely what the terms "Albanian," "Serb," "Montenegrin," or "Muslim" mean. Nearly one half of Albanian-speakers do not live in Albania proper but in Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Italy, and elsewhere. The Albanian diaspora is proportionally the largest European diaspora today, yet Albania, too, has its ethnic minorities. Montenegrin is a historical and cultural designation: most Montenegrins speak Serbo-Croatian, and, like the Serbs, they are generally of the Eastern Orthodox persuasion. To be a Serb can mean either that one is from the Republic of Serbia or that one is ethnically a Serb. To be a Muslim can denote either a confessional affiliation or an ethnic affiliation, or it can denote both. There are even some people in Yugoslavia, and hence also in Kosovo, who call themselves Yugoslavs, mostly those of a mixed ethnic or confessional background.

Throughout history, Kosovo has frequently changed its name, its external and internal boundaries, and the ethnic and confessional composition of its inhabitants. The Kosovars have been conquered many times, assimilating their conquerors or adopting their conquerors' ways. Under varying circumstances, they have fought bitterly among themselves or joined forces against a foreign power. In short, Kosovo is a typical Balkan province, whose inhabitants have suffered and inflicted suffering on others, and have retained their pride, and—be they Serbs, Albanians, or of any other nationality—have proven ready to defend their honor with arms.

The blood feud is one of the oldest and most devastating traditions in the region. Vickers writes that a recent truce among Albanians in Kosovo, united against their Serbian oppressors, came as a blessing to the 20,000-odd Albanian men who had been virtual prisoners within their walled compounds. Murder

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

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

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committed by relatives whom these men often barely knew made them the legitimate targets of revenge by men who themselves often barely knew their own murdered relative. One of the most resented and least effective bureaucratic measures by Ottomans or Serbs has been to try to confiscate the weapons in the possession of the Kosovars.

All this does not mean, as both Malcolm and Vickers rightly insist, that ethnic hatred is ingrained in the people. Indeed, Kosovars tended to get along well with one another; and when they did not, it was less owing to language, religion, or nationality than to the complexities of clan and family ties. Being almost entirely illiterate, Kosovars remained unaware of their ethnicity until reforming intellectuals in the nineteenth century enlightened them on the subject. Even thereafter, the province's Serbian-speakers tended to treat Serbs from the other parts as foreigners, while Kosovo Albanians felt the same way about other Albanians.

As a consequence of repeated ethnic cleansings directed from above, however, such unpatriotic attitudes no longer exist, and ethnic lines are clearly drawn in the province. Tragically for all, Kosovo is a sacred land, especially in the eyes of the Serbs. This myth of a holy land has been repeatedly invoked to legitimate aggression and violence. As Malcolm demonstrates, in Kosovo as well as in the rest of the Balkans, political decisions are influenced less by what really happened than by the myths that have arisen from the dramas of the past.

As elsewhere in East Central Europe, places in Kosovo have multiple names. By using the version favored by one authority, one is bound to annoy another authority. Thus the Serbian government insists on calling the province Kosovo and Metohija, or Kosmet in brief, which is supposed to convey the message that Metohija, which forms the western half of the province, is even more Serbian than the eastern, Kosovan part. For the Albanians, the entire province is Kosovo. (Or more precisely, Kosove or Kosova. Kosovo is the form currently used in most English-language publications.)

Serbia is the largest and most dynamic power in this region of mini-powers, and during the last two centuries Serbs were the driving force in the anti-Ottoman and anti-Habsburg struggle. For this reason, the myths of the Serbs carry the most weight, and also meet with the strongest opposition. Every Serbian nationalist knows that Serbs were first in Kosovo, a claim that others dispute. Unlike Vickers, who is somewhat sympathetic to the Serbs, Malcolm suggests that, when they arrived in the region in the seventh century, the Serbs were just one of many Slavic-speaking tribal groups. (Malcolm reads Albanian, Serbo-Croatian, Italian, French, German, Latin, Spanish, Greek, Romanian, and Turkish; and his published works include the equally weighty *Bosnia: A Short History* (1994), a musical biography of the Romanian composer George Enescu, and the life of a sixteenth-century Venetian heretic.) The more ancient inhabitants of the region were Latin-speakers; and today's Vlachs, a small Romanian-speaking group living in the mountains, may well be their descendants.

As for the Albanians, they claim to descend directly from the ancient Illyrians, which might or might not be true. In any case, Albanians first emerge in the historical record in the eleventh century. Albanian is, incidentally, a difficult and isolated Indo-European language, unrelated to Latin, Greek, and the Slavic languages. Curiously enough, the eleventh century version of the French *Chanson de Roland*, which relates the adventures of French knights, contains a garbled list of Albanian place names, and one manuscript of the poem even includes a reference to "Albanie."

Not that Albanian-speakers were likely to call themselves "Albanians." Their word for themselves is "Shqiptar," a term whose origins are as obscure as the origins of most other names and peoples in the region. In general, the sources are often so confusing, and the tendency of medieval chroniclers to garble names and accept legend for fact was so widespread, that historians are forced repeatedly to throw up their hands. Since people have been massively intermarrying for many centuries, and since there is no such thing as a pure race, the question of who was there first should make no difference today. Unfortunately, an enormous amount of ink and blood is being spilled over this nonsensical question.

The Middle Ages saw a number of Christian rulers in the Balkans who, like princes everywhere, allied themselves with or against one another in changing succession. A few even succeeded in creating large, ephemeral empires. In the fourteenth century, for example, the Serbian king Dusan presided over a great state with an extraordinary flourishing of culture. The latter is still visible in the magnificent Orthodox churches and monasteries in Kosovo and elsewhere. By then, most inhabitants of the Balkans had long accepted the Eastern Orthodox variety of Christianity, though others, including some Albanians, had embraced Western Christianity and still others belonged to one or more dissident Christian sects. In the course of events, the Serbian kings, like their counterparts in Bulgaria before them, had also managed to free their Orthodox church from the tutelage of the Greek Patriarch in Constantinople.

Then came the Ottoman Turks, in the late fourteenth century. Their arrival changed the history of the Balkans, though not as fast and as catastrophically as legend would have it. Malcolm devotes an entire chapter to the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, the greatest tragedy in Serbian and Balkan history, at least in the eyes of Serbian nationalists. A few years ago, Serb terrorists committed unspeakable crimes against Muslims in Bosnia partly to avenge the Battle of Kosovo, an event for which Bosnian Muslims are no more responsible than Jews are for the killing of Christ.

Were it not for their terrible consequences, the legends surrounding the Battle of Kosovo could be admired as a wondrous folktale, complete with the Christ-like Serbian Prince Lazar leading his small band of knights against the Infidel; the villain Prince Vuk Brankovic, who betrayed and, in some versions of the legend, killed his brother-in-law Prince Lazar; and the young Serbian hero Milos Obilic, who revenged the death of Lazar by killing Murad, the Ottoman Emperor, perishing in the process. According to the Serbian construction of history, which has been vastly aggrandized by modern nationalists, the defeat at Kosovo marked the end of Serbian independence, after which nearly five hundred years of darkness descended on Serbia and on the Western world that Lazar and his warriors had so selflessly defended.

In the face of such a powerful legend, it might make little sense to search for the truth, but Malcolm does so anyway. He proves that many Serbs and other Christians fought on the Muslim side at Kosovo. This was nothing extraordinary: Christian princes and Christian soldiers behaved no differently in Spain and elsewhere during that period. We do not know how Lazar and Murad were killed, but Malcolm speculates that it was a Hungarian knight who slew the Turkish Sultan, a proposition that is unlikely to win Malcolm much favor in the Balkans. As for the traitor Vuk Brankovic, the Judas of Serbian history, we find him fighting the Turks a few years later. On the other hand, Prince Stefan, Lazar's son and another great friend of culture

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and the arts, sided with the Turks, and this secured him, among other benefits, the possessions of Vuk Brankovic.

The Ottoman victory—if a victory it was, for many historians see it as a draw—did not mean the immediate end of Serbia or of Balkan independence. Christian princes continued to fight one another in alliance with or against the Turks. Only after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 did the Ottomans gradually extend their rule, to Kosovo in 1455 and to Serbia in 1459. The picture that Balkan nationalists paint of the Ottomans is invariably bleak. In reality, as Malcolm demonstrates, and as other historians have shown, Ottoman rule, especially during its first two centuries, was superior in many ways to Christian rule.

Ottoman law codes were more humane; the treatment of Jews was far better, and the tax burden generally less onerous. Ottoman slavery was often less terrible than slavery under the Christian princes, and slaves, if they converted to Islam, could rise to the highest positions in the state. The famous child tribute, the *devshirme*, was one way for a Christian to make a career: families competed with each other in offering their teenage boys to the authorities.

Christians were allowed to serve in the Ottoman army, and they were often rewarded with lifetime land tenure. Christian and Jewish converts to Islam more or less governed the Ottoman Empire, with Albanians playing perhaps the most important role.

It was only when the Ottomans ran out of territories to conquer, and corruption and sloth set in, that the condition of Christians gradually deteriorated. Landowning became hereditary; peasants became serfs; local governors became petty tyrants who fought one another as well as the Sublime Porte. A turning point came in the late 1680s, when Habsburg imperial crusaders invaded the Balkans, appearing even in Kosovo. They remained in the province for only a few months. Soon Ottoman power was reestablished along the Danube; but the Western invasion led to the creation of another powerful and dangerous historical myth, that of the great exodus of Serbs from Kosovo.

As Malcolm explains, Orthodox writers interpreted this event as the second stage in the great Serbian Passion Play that began with Lazar's symbolic crucifixion at Kosovo, continued with the Serbian exodus late in the seventeenth century (this was the equivalent of the death and burial of Christ), and ended with Resurrection, the Serbian reconquest of Kosovo in 1912. Serbian writers hold that, to avoid enslavement by the vengeful Turks, Patriarch Arsenije of Pec led a huge flock of Orthodox from Kosovo to southern Hungary, thereby emptying Kosovo, the land where all Serbs had originated. Vickers accepts this view, but Malcolm won't hear of it; and, truly, it is more likely that the Serbian-speaking Orthodox, as well as other people, gradually drifted north. Rather than marching out en masse, they made their way bit by bit, especially to Hungary where, after the devastating Turkish wars, rich and depopulated lands were to be found.

Those who remained in Kosovo changed their religion and even their language repeatedly over the centuries. In general, families, clans, and tribes moved, settled, converted, and reconverted in the Balkans; and it is only in modern times that such acts have become a major political issue. No doubt, the proportion of Albanian-speaking Muslims has increased in Kosovo over the centuries, so that today they form the overwhelming majority; but this was due partly to the willingness of local Serbs, who were somewhat better educated than Albanians, to move away in search of better economic opportunities. Another reason is that Muslim Albanians have tended to have more children than the Orthodox Serbs. Still, as Malcolm shows, city-dwelling Albanians have also reduced the number of their offspring. The fact is that, for quite some time now, the mainly rural and religious Muslim Albanians have been vastly outbreeding the local Serbs. For Serbian nationalists, this is not a normal development, but a part of the vast Albanian-Muslim-Turkish conspiracy.

Serbia freed itself from Ottoman rule early in the nineteenth century, and its example was soon followed by others. Yet Kosovo was still very much part of the Ottoman Empire when the Sublime Porte introduced a series of reforms aimed at modernizing, liberalizing, and centralizing the Empire. This presented even the most loyal Balkan subjects of the Sultan with an insoluble dilemma. Istanbul attempted to take power back from the local lords who had usurped it, and at the same time tried to reform and to consolidate the state. In the eyes of many provincials, this reform appeared as brutal oppression. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Muslims and non-Muslims together revolted against central power. In the name of freedom, local tyrants waged wars against a state that tried to build schools, to improve the judiciary, and to free the peasants from the yoke of the landowners. In the conflict

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

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between the center and the periphery, the Ottoman center proved to be clumsy and weak.

Reforms cost money, and the Kosovars resented new taxes and conscription. In the Russo-Turkish war of 1875-1878, Albanians and other Muslims fought against the Ottomans. Turkish defeat caused Serbia to extend its borders to the vicinity of Kosovo, a process that was to culminate in the Balkan wars of 1912-1913, when Serbia annexed Kosovo in its entirety. The Balkan wars also marked the culmination of Albanian national reawakening and the creation, in 1912-1913, of a rather chaotic independent Albanian state.

In the Balkan wars, Muslim Albanians generally fought against the Ottoman Empire, which was then governed by the Young Turks, an aggressively nationalist revolutionary group. As Malcolm writes, the Albanian Muslims "pulled down the columns of the Ottoman Empire upon their own head." The wars were marked by terrible atrocities on all sides, setting the tone for the horrors of the twentieth century. Reporting for a Ukrainian newspaper, Lev Bronstein, who became better known to history as Leon Trotsky, wrote from the Balkans:

> The Serbs in Old Serbia, in their national endeavour to correct data in the ethnographical statistics that are not quite favourable to them, are engaged quite simply in systematic extermination of the Muslim population.

And Trotsky quoted a Serbian officer:

> The horrors actually began as soon as we crossed into Kosovo. Entire Albanian villages had been turned into pillars of fire.... For two days before my arrival in Skopje [the capital of today's Macedonia] the inhabitants had woken up to the sight of heaps of Albanian corpses with severed heads.

World War I brought new episodes in the dismal story of atrocities. The Albanians sided with Austria-Hungary and Germany, and after the armies of the Central Powers had overrun the region, in 1915, Albanians massacred Serbs or drove them out of Kosovo. When the Central Powers lost the war in 1918, however, the triumphant Serb army, advancing from the south in company with the British and the French, took its revenge in Kosovo. The province was reintegrated into Serbia, and through Serbia into the newly created South-Slav state.

Yugoslavia, as it soon came to be called, was a multinational state, just like Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire on whose ruins it had been created. Yet it differed from its antecedents in that the Yugoslav regime, firmly in the hands of Serbian politicians, pretended that theirs was not a multinational state but a nation-state, in which "Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were but one nation with three names," and other ethnic groups had only a negligible role.

Since "plucky," "heroic," and "martyred" Serbia had fought bravely on the side of the Entente in the war, its leaders were allowed, in the Paris peace treaties, to get away with any pretense and any claim. The results were tragic for all, including the Serbs. The clauses in the peace treaties that protected the ethnic minorities were largely ignored. In Kosovo, Albanian-language schools and publications were forbidden, the official claim being that there were no Albanians in that province, only Albanian-speaking Serbs. This led to the so-called kacak rebellion, a bloody affair, but one that did not actually threaten the Yugoslav kingdom.

Much more serious for Yugoslavia was the discontent of the Croats, for which no solution could be found. In April 1941, when the German army marched into Yugoslavia, the myth of the "one nation with three names" exploded. Croats and others deserted immediately, and the German invasion resembled more a triumphant march than a bloody conquest. World War II was marked by the now-customary reversals of fortunes. Again, Croats, Albanians, and Bosnian Muslims tended to side with the Germans. Kosovo itself was divided into a German, an Italian, and a Bulgarian section; in each, the population was treated differently. Resistance to the occupiers began very soon, but also deteriorated almost immediately into a civil war.

Serbian royalist Cetniks fought Albanians and Tito's communist Partisans. Serbian government troops under German tutelage fought Albanians, Cetniks, and Partisans. In Albania and Kosovo, the anticommunist Balli Kombetar movement alternately sided with and opposed the Germans and the Italians. Finally, the communist Partisans asserted themselves even in Kosovo, where initially they had only a handful of followers. Meanwhile, Tito's forces had to face the dilemma of whether or not to encourage an Albanian independence movement.

As Vickers describes so well, the Communist International originally branded Yugoslavia "a product of world imperialism" that should be dismembered. After 1935, however, Stalin adopted an antifascist Popular Front policy that emphasized collective security and condemned the secession of disaffected regions as nationalism. From that time on, Communists were to see the unity of Serbian-dominated Royal Yugoslavia as in the interest of progressive mankind.

During the war, Tito contemplated setting up a large communist Albania, which might include Kosovo and would operate under the benevolent tutelage of communist Yugoslavia, possibly as part of a future Balkan federation. But Stalin wouldn't hear of any such thing, and in any case Tito could not completely ignore Serbian sensibilities, so Kosovo remained in Serbia. All of this occurred with much additional bloodshed, except that this time the killing was carried out by communist Partisans who cared more for politics and class than for the nationality and religion of their victims. Kosovo now became an autonomous province within the Serbian Socialist Republic, which in turn constituted a theoretically sovereign state within the Yugoslav Socialist Federation.

The Titoists were often bloodthirsty, and their regime ultimately failed for reasons of economic mismanagement, corruption, and lack of genuine freedom, but in a region such as Kosovo their rule must be judged to have been beneficial. Western travelers (and Malcolm and Vickers, too) relate how poor and backward Kosovo was before the advent of the Titoist regime. There were only a few schools, and the vast majority of population was illiterate. Women were either beasts of burden in the poor households or bejeweled and incarcerated idlers in the better-off Muslim families. But now women enjoyed legal equality; the number of schools mushroomed; and it was not long before Kosovars were able to study at their own university. There was even a modest economic upswing in the region, though the more enterprising Kosovars continued to go north or, increasingly, abroad for work. Most importantly, the UDB-a, the dreaded political police, maintained the peace.

In the long run, however, no major regional problems were solved. The schools produced a plethora of Kosovar sociologists, psychologists, and art historians, but few engineers and scientists. The economic gap between north and south in Yugoslavia grew even wider, with each side claiming exploitation by the other. Finally, when the constitution of 1974, one of Tito's many laudable constitutional experiments, gave near-republican status to Kosovo, the Serbs became enraged. Clearly they had been outbred in Kosovo, a fact against which no pilgrimages to the holy site of the Battle of Kosovo, and no colonization projects, have ever provided a remedy.

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During World War I, nationalists in the Habsburg Monarchy waited for the death of the old emperor Francis Joseph (which finally occurred in 1916) in order to pursue their political goals by violent means; and now, in Yugoslavia, nationalists waited for the death of old Tito, the last East Central European emperor. He died in 1980. By then, Serbian Communist intellectuals had already spoken up against Albanian claims and in defense of Serbian national interests. Without the incessant agitation of these academics, the Bosnian horrors, the conflict in Kosovo, and the break-up of Yugoslavia might still have come, but in all likelihood they would not have come so hideously and so swiftly.

Not that Albanian intellectuals lagged far behind in stirring up trouble. Ignoring the fact that Kosovars in Tito's Yugoslavia enjoyed ethnic rights matched only by those granted the South Tyrolians in Italy and the ethnic minorities in Switzerland, Kosovar students revolted in 1981. Their agitation has not ceased. While Serbian newspapers avidly spread wild stories of the Albanian rape of Serbian women, Albanian intellectuals spoke, in the same exaggerated way, of Serbian police terror.

In 1986, the celebrated Serbian novelist Dobrica Cosic and fellow academicians issued a horrifying memorandum in Belgrade, accusing the Kosovo Albanians of genocide and demanding, among other things, the abrogation of the constitution of 1974. On April 24, 1987, at a commemorative festival held at the scene of the Battle of Kosovo, the Serbian Communist Party apparatchik Slobodan Milosevic correctly measured the mood of the Serbian celebrants in a hysterical nationalist speech. There, and later in Belgrade, while addressing huge masses of people, Milosevic conjured the time-honored image of a beloved nation threatened with extinction, and warned that Serbs would never give up Kosovo: "Every nation has a love which eternally warms its heart. For Serbia it is Kosovo."

As Miranda Vickers writes, "Everything started with Kosovo, and everything will finish with Kosovo." Frightened by growing Serbian nationalism, Slovenia, Croatia, and finally even Macedonia and Bosnia declared their independence. Yugoslavia fell apart, and the war began in Bosnia over the division of that multiethnic republic. By then communism had collapsed even in Stalinist Albania; and the Serbian national assembly had abolished the autonomy of Kosovo. The Albanians had followed the example of Solidarity in Poland, peacefully creating their own polity within the

ASSOCIATION OF LITERARY SCHOLARS AND CRITICS

THE FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Toronto, the Toronto Hilton, 2-4 October 1998

Friday, 2 October

2:00-4:00 ***Prose Argument.*** Chair: **David Bromwich** (Yale Univ.)

Richard Poirier (Rutgers Univ.): "Emerson: 'Are they 'my' poor?' "

Margery Sabin (Wellesley College): "Anecdote and Argument in British Writing about India."

Philip Horne (Univ. of London): "Critical Correspondences: James and his Confrères."

4:30-5:30 Poetry Reading by **Geoffrey Hill** from his forthcoming book.

5:30-7:00 Reception, with address by President **Eleanor Cook.**

Saturday, 3 October

9:00-12:00 ***The Language of Poetry and the Language of the State.*** Chair: **Michael Putnam** (Brown Univ.)

Geoffrey Hill (Boston Univ.): "Language, Suffering, and Silence."

Sarah Spence (Univ. of Georgia): "Caesar and Caesuras: The Poetics of Empire in Vergil and the *Aeneid.*"

John Peck: "Sacrifice and Poetics: a Half-Forgotten Answer to the State."

2:00-5:00 ***Proust.*** Chair: **Jean-Louis Major** (Univ. of Ottawa)

Richard Howard (Columbia Univ.): "Proust and Music."

Roger Shattuck (Boston Univ.): "Sheer Length."

Christie McDonald (Harvard Univ.): "Anxiety and the Gift of Art."

8:00 Banquet, and **Margaret Atwood**: "Negotiating with the Dead."

Sunday, 4 October

9:00-11:00 ***Varieties of Dramatic Performance: Mask, Gesture, Language.*** Chair: **Stephen Scully** (Boston Univ.)

Peter Burian (Duke Univ.): "What Makes Greek Drama Dramatic: Movement, Gesture, and Word in Greek Tragic Theater."

Frank Hoff (Univ. of Toronto): "Perspectives on Acting and Actor's Training: Zeami, Kanze Hisao, Eugenio Barba, Suzuki Tadashi."

Kenneth Gross (Univ. of Rochester): "An Imaginary Theater."

The conference registration fee of $60 ($40 students) covers all meetings and events, as well as breakfast on both days and Saturday lunch and dinner. For room reservations call the Toronto Hilton: 800-267-2281 (fax 416-869-3187). To register for the conference, or for further information about the Association, which was formed in 1994 as a response to the present state of literary studies, write to the ALSC, 2039 Shattuck Ave., Suite 202, Berkeley, CA 94704-1116, USA. Phone: 510-849-2491/ fax:2492. Email: alitsc@aol.com.

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Serbian state and society.

It is now commonplace to accuse the Serbs, who were celebrated as heroes in World War I and World War II, of brutality and oppression. These accusations have a terrible basis in reality. Milosevic and Karadzic and Mladic and others are guilty of heinous crimes committed in Bosnia. Still, it is amazing how patient the Serbian government has been in the matter of Kosovo: it has tolerated an Albanian shadow government and an Albanian boycott of all schools and state offices as well as of parliamentary elections. Albanians have refused to cooperate even in the taking of the census, and (to offer but one more example) they have avoided using state-owned hospitals, which amounts to virtually all hospitals. The sick are taken care of at home, often by medical students.

The leader of the Kosovo Albanians is Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, whom Vickers describes as an enigmatic and somewhat eccentric figure. His aim seems to be to preserve peace while proving to the world that the Kosovar Albanians can govern themselves. So far, the strategy of civil disobedience has brought only meager fruits. Kosovars are becoming even poorer, and the Dayton accord on Bosnia in 1995 virtually ignored the Kosovo question. The peacemakers at Dayton had enough trouble bringing together Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians without worrying about such a seemingly quiet place as Kosovo. It is true that, quite recently, an "Education Accord" providing for the return of Albanians to state schools was signed between Milosevic and Rugova (though not in one another's presence), but the execution of the agreement remains in doubt.

Impatient with what they see as the failure of passive resistance, armed groups have emerged in Kosovo to harass the Serbian police and militia. They seem to be receiving arms and money from Muslim radical groups in the Middle East. This support appears to be channeled primarily through Albania, though there is no sign that any Albanian government, including the present one, has ever seriously planned or favored the annexation of Kosovo. Nor can the Kosovars fail to notice that even their miserable living standards compare favorably with those of the inhabitants of Albania.

The struggle between the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army and the Serbian police has been local: armed struggle seems to be the specialty of a few clans. There can be no doubt regarding the ruthlessness of the Serbian police, and especially of the Serbian militia that has descended on Kosovo; but history has yet to show a police or military force that did not grow ruthless when attacked stealthily by fighters dressed as civilians. Only when the media finally sheds the myth of the invariably heroic freedom fighter opposed by the invariably brutal policeman will it be possible to gain a more profound understanding of the struggle in Kosovo.

One thing is certain: Bosnia cannot serve as a precedent for the solution of the Kosovo crisis. In Bosnia, Serbian and Croatian terrorists engaged in a brutal ethnic cleansing in order to gain land in a sovereign republic. Had the United States not intervened with bombings by NATO warplanes, ethnic cleansing might have ended in genocide; or rather, the genocide might have been completed. In Kosovo, an embattled police and an embattled Serbian minority are attempting to defend a place that is constitutionally a part of Serbia. The official Serbian argument that Serbia and, by extension, Rump Yugoslavia are multinational states in which the rights of every minority are guaranteed is not far from the truth.

The Serbs are also correct in arguing that they cannot possibly arrive at a settlement with a Kosovar leadership that would not acquiesce in anything less than independence. Apparently the Kosovars are unwilling to understand that not a single major power, and certainly not the United States, favors independence for Kosovo. But suppose independence is gained. How would Kosovars in an independent Kosovo earn their living? It is quite wrong to believe that the much-heralded underground riches of Kosovo—lead, zinc, magnesite, bauxite and chrome—are inexhaustible.

Since the Kosovars will not abandon their pursuit of the independence that Serbia is unwilling to grant, the conflict is likely to worsen, and to extend to neighboring countries where Serbs, Muslims, Albanians, and Montenegrins live. Vickers, perhaps wisely, offers neither prophecy nor advice, but Malcolm concludes his masterful work with a reasonable suggestion: "When ordinary Serbs learn to think more rationally and humanely about Kosovo, and more critically about some of their national myths, all the people of Kosovo and Serbia will benefit—not least the Serbs themselves."

Unfortunately, all this is not likely to happen soon. Meanwhile Serbs and Albanians will continue to be irrational and often inhumane. To prevent more bloodshed, and especially the spread of war in the Balkans, the United Nations, and the United States in particular, will have to devote more and more attention to this inflamed part of the world. It will have to send diplomats, and one day, perhaps, it will have to send troops, not to favor one side or another but to enforce a bitter peace.

ISTVAN DEAK is Seth Low Professor of History at Columbia University.

Impurity and Danger

BY ELLIOTT HOROWITZ

The Singular Beast: Jews, Christians, & the Pig
by Claudine Fabre-Vassas
translated by Carol Volk

(Columbia University Press, 401 pp., $35)

On the last page of her wide-ranging and stimulating book, Claudine Fabre-Vassas adduces a Hungarian folk tradition transcribed at the end of the nineteenth century. It relates that after the Crucifixion a pig rubbed itself against Christ's cross, but no witness was able to say which side of its body had touched the cross. Consequently, "the Jews concluded that it was doubly inedible." Indeed, although the Bible had listed the pig together with the camel and the hare among the "unclean" animals whose flesh was prohibited, Jewish tradition and popular practice later singled out the swine as being, in some ways, "doubly inedible."

For centuries, this special strictness about the pig characterized the Iberian crypto-Jews, who externally professed Christianity but secretly observed what they could of their ancestral religion. In his still valuable *History of the Marranos* (1932), Cecil Roth noted that although they could rarely procure ritually slaughtered meat, marranos were often fanatical about abstaining from pork, "going so far as to destroy any dish in which it had been inadvertently prepared, and

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telling their children that those who ate pork would be turned into pigs." And in his pioneering study of Majorca's *xuetas* (first published in 1936), Baruch Braunstein quoted the claim made in 1672 by the inquisitor Don Juan de Fontamar that the secret Jews "stop eating sheep on the days when the pigs are killed because they are slaughtered at the same butcher and are cut up on the same tables." And a more recent study of the *xuetas* in the seventeenth century cites the inquisitional testimony of a Christian maidservant who reported that her employers never partook of *tocino*, but would permit the servants to roast it for themselves, provided that they did their cooking on the roof.

The visceral aversion of Jews to swine survived also into the modern era. Many examples could be adduced. In their wickedly witty dictionary of Hebrew slang, Dan Ben-Amotz and Netiva Ben-Yehudah used a pig to illustrate the word *fikhsa*, an expression of disgust. And Mel Brooks, in *Robin Hood: Men in Tights*, has Prince John shout "treif!" when Robin brazenly throws a wild boar on his table. Where, then, did this Jewish repugnance toward the pig's flesh begin?

The biblical scholar Jacob Milgrom has argued that the biblical prohibition was rooted in the pig's association with ancient deities of the underworld, though he acknowledges that "it did not become the reviled animal par excellence until the eating of its flesh became a test of the Jew's loyalty to Judaism in Hellenistic times." The first and second Books of the Maccabees, which describe the Jewish revolt against the Seleucid king Antiochus IV in the second century BCE, tell of the latter's attempt to force the Jews of Judea to eat pigs and to offer up pigs in their Temple, and of "the martyrs for the sake of pork," as Augustine later somewhat dismissively referred to them.

By that time the Jewish repugnance for pork had become well known. Fabre-Vassas cites the Council of Antioch, whose bishops encouraged the consumption of pork "which the carnal Synagogue execrates." The emergence of Islam seems only to have strengthened the attachment of Christians to pork, which came to be linked with their liberation from the (bodily) circumcision practiced by Jews and Muslims. "We Christians eat pork," asserted the spokesman for Christianity in the late seventh-century *Trophies of Damascus*, "because He who freed me from circumcision freed me also from abstinence from pork."

Even after the Maccabean revolution, however, the "execration" of pork by the "carnal Synagogue" was not quite total. As Louis Feldman has noted in *Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World*, the Hellenistic Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria asserted in the first century that there is no meat as delicious as that of the pig, explaining the biblical prohibition of its consumption in terms of the need to avoid gluttony. Yet the centuries of Roman rule in Palestine undoubtedly contributed further to the repugnance of its Jews toward the pig and its flesh. Feldman has pointed to the special fondness of the Romans for pork, illustrated by "the fact that Latin has more terms for swine than any other animal."

Feldman neglected to mention that the rabbinic sages used the boar as a symbol for the Roman (and later the Byzantine) Empire. The Psalmist had described Israel as a vine which had been "plucked up" by the Lord from Egypt and replanted in Canaan, only to be attacked by wild beasts ("The boar out of the field doth ravage it, and that which moveth in the field feedeth upon it"). Whatever he meant by these metaphors, the Jewish sages read them as allusions to Roman military might. "*The boar out of the wood*," they claimed, "refers to the emperor, while *that which moveth in the field* refers to his generals in the field."

And this was hardly the only instance in which the rabbis demonstrated their recognition that the pig was something "good to think with." About the verse in Genesis that reported that Esau was 40 years old when he married Judith and Basemath the daughters of Hittites, the sages, rather than wishing Esau (seen by them as a symbol first for Rome and then for Christendom) a hearty *mazel tov*, somewhat rudely accused him of sanctimonious duplicity. Esau, they claimed, had chosen the age of forty for marriage because his father Isaac had also married at that age. As paraphrased by the great scholar Louis Ginzberg (and translated by Henrietta Szold): "Esau was like a swine that stretches out its feet when it lies down, to show that it is cloven-footed like the clean animals, though it is nonetheless one of the unclean animals. Until his fortieth year Esau made a practice of violating the wives of other men, and then at his marriage he acted as though he were following the example of his pious father."

Writing in the 1920's, Ginzberg insisted that the "designation of Esau (=Rome) as 'swine'... was not [originally] intended as an expression of contempt, but was coined with reference to the standard of the Roman legion stationed in Palestine." Was this so, or was Ginzberg's disclaimer a modern apolo-

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

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gia for rabbinic rudeness? The latter, I suspect; but the true importance for Jewish history of the abovementioned midrash lies in its having been incorporated, around the time of the First Crusade, by Solomon ben Isaac, or Rashi, in his famous commentary on Scripture, and hence transmitted to nearly every literate Jew for several centuries. Yet Rashi included a line from the midrash that Ginzberg later chose to skip. After noting that Esau was compared to a swine that stretches out its feet in order to show that it is cloven-footed like the clean animals, Rashi added: "So too these rob and extort and pretend to be honorable." Using the singular, the midrash had referred to the hypocrisy of the "evil kingdom," by which Rome was clearly intended; but Rashi introduced the vaguer plural subject "these," by which he clearly meant (as his medieval readers would have understood) Europe's Christian rulers.

Rashi was born and died (in 1105) in northern France, where more pigs were raised than in the warmer and drier south. He is nowhere mentioned in Fabre-Vassas's book, despite its heavily (and perhaps overly) French focus. Maimonides does appear on a number of occasions, though he is somewhat misleadingly referred to as a "twelfth-century Andalusian doctor." In her introduction, Fabre-Vassas briefly cites the view of Maimonides that the biblical prohibition of pork was rooted in health considerations. Had she consulted the *Guide of the Perplexed* (which was translated into French in the nineteenth century by Solomon Munk, Renan's successor at the College of France), she might have had something more to say about his comments. "You know to what extent the Law insists upon the need to remove filth out of sight, even in the field and in a military camp, and all the more within cities," wrote Maimonides. "Now if swine were used for food, market places and even houses would have been dirtier than latrines, as may be seen at present in the country of the Franks." The author of these words, composed in Arabic written in Hebrew letters, seems to have been expressing himself as a proud Egyptian no less than as a pious Jew.

Somewhat surprisingly, for someone who lives and works in France, Fabre-Vassas does very little with the mutual abstention from pork that linked Muslims and Jews, and separated them from "the Franks." Had she explored this affinity further, she might have encountered the vivid chronicle of the Third Crusade composed by Baha ad-Din, a contemporary of Maimonides and a member of Saladin's court. In his chronicle, he described the ruse by means of which the Muslims were able, during the summer of 1190, to sneak a ship loaded with provisions into the heavily blockaded port of Acre:

> The Franks, God damn them, had posted their ships all round Acre to blockade the harbor against Muslim shipping.... A group of Muslims embarked at Beirut with a cargo of four hundred sacks of grain ... and other provisions. They dressed in Frankish clothes, shaved their beards, put some pigs on the upper deck where they could be seen from a distance, set up crosses, weighed anchor and made for the city from the open sea ... Thus the Muslim ship was free to follow its own course, and entered port on a favorable wind, safe and sound by God's grace.

Pigs, then, together with the cross and the clean-shaven face, were perceived by medieval Muslims as icons of European Christian ("Frankish") identity. Similar connections were made later in Europe itself. The Hungarian folktale cited above posits a primeval relationship between the pig and Christ's cross. And from another quarter of eastern Europe, we may cite a Jewish story linking the pig and beardlessness: the Maggid of Chelm, a Hasidic oracle who died in 1812, observed among his congregation a wealthy beardless man, who was known to be a miser, sitting in the front row. Looking hard at the wealthy man he narrated the following parable:

> I dreamed that I was walking on the street, and an ox met me. He greeted me in a friendly manner. "What friend of mine are you?" I asked. "I give you my flesh," replied the ox. Next a cow greeted me. "I give you of my milk," she said. Next a he-goat greeted me, and said: "Both of us wear long beards." A swine came next to greet me. I cried at her "Keep away, thou swine; I do not eat thy meat; I do not drink thy milk, and thou hast no beard; what then hast thou to do with me?" The miser left his seat and walked out.

Although the Maggid's parable was intended to stress that no one received either meat or milk from the beardless (and pig-like) miser, one wonders whether the words "I do not drink thy milk" addressed to the swine do not also constitute an oblique response to the popular anti-Jewish motif of the *Judensau*. The visual image of the Jews' Sow, especially common in medieval and early modern Germany (and revived by the Nazis), customarily depicted a Jew (or a number of Jews) sucking at its teats, while others occupied themselves sexually or scatologically with its hindquarters.

In perhaps the best chapter of her book, called "Red Easter," Fabre-Vassas makes some interesting connections between pig slaughter, circumcision, and the accusation of ritual murder. Of the four *Judensau* illustrations reproduced in her book, three link the Jew's Sow with the martyrdom of Simon of Trent in 1475. The famous depiction of Simon's murder in Schedel's *Nuremberg Chronicle* of 1493 (a page I recently saw in the window of a Viennese *antiquariat* shop and could not resist purchasing) showed the Jews both circumcising him and drawing his blood; but as R. Po-Chia Hsia has noted in *Trent 1475*, representations of Simon in the Baroque period shy away from graphically depicting his circumcision.

Although Fabre-Vassas neither reproduces nor comments on the Schedel print, she does reproduce two earlier ones of Simon's martyrdom, one a highly unusual Florentine engraving (whose source she unfortunately does not provide) at the heart of which, she writes, "is a curious scene" in which little Simon lies prone:

> The emphasis is placed on the treatment of his genitals, which are being cut with a large knife. A gaping wound is opened at his throat, from which the blood is flowing into a receptacle.... Shearing scissors are ready to cut into his chest and needles pricking his skin contribute to bleeding him white. Everyone is wearing, on their chests, backs, or heads, not the simple circle which designates them as Jews but, quite visibly, a badge with a pig at its center.

The picture, she might have added, is full of paradox. Jews mark a Christian child with the sign of the Jew, while they

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themselves carry the sign of the proscribed pig.

Fabre-Vassas, an ethnologist of the table who is also good with pictures, has been writing about pigs and Christians for nearly two decades, but she is clearly a newcomer to the study of Jews and Judaism. It is telling that in *The Singular Beast's* index we find under "Judaism" only two sub-entries: "[Judaism] and castration" and "Christianity and [Judaism]." Neither Ginzberg's nor Feldman's works are cited. Fabre-Vassas seems to have consulted not even the entry "Swine" in the old *Jewish Encyclopedia*, or "Pig" in the newer *Encyclopaedia Judaica*. This is the sort of book of which the Chelmer Maggid might have said: "What hast thou to do with me?"

Its history is also a bit shaky. The abovementioned Council of Antioch is placed in the third rather than the fourth century, and Fabre-Vassas seems to think that the Jews were expelled from Portugal five years before their expulsion from Spain rather than five years after. In reporting the upside-down hanging of Jews together with pigs (for blasphemy) in early seventeenth century Mantua, her date is off only by a year, but she gives the number of Jewish victims as five rather than seven. European geography can also be a problem. Fabre-Vassas believes that the Nino de La Guardia ritual murder affair of 1490 "exploded in Toledo," rather than in the town of La Guardia, several miles away.

How, then, did she come to her present subject? "It all began," she explains in her introduction, "on the high plateaus of the Languedocian Pyrenees in the early 1970s," where she was "attempting to understand something of the agropastoral societies through the language of cooking and, in particular, the calendar that divides up its primary tendencies." Talking to the Catholic locals about their culinary traditions concerning Lent and Carnival, she found the pig emerging as a central figure: "And since the pig, killed, divided up, hidden, stolen, eaten throughout the year, was the tangible center, I recorded, in fastidious detail, the sequence of gestures, the abundance of words that, by manipulating and designating it, turned the pig into a social phenomenon."

Fabre-Vassas discovered that the bond-forming proximity of the pig in many households transformed it into "one of the children," whose slaughter therefore "risked rousing the unbearable specter of cannibalism." The peculiar position of the pig "at the boundary between man and animal" (as some in Europe perceived its polar opposite, the Jew) brought her beyond southern France as far afield as Hungary and Lithuania to "the rich collections of stories that ... expressed this transitional quality," and which concerned themselves with the pig's allegedly human origins. She discovered that "almost all the European stories on the human origin of the pig have Jews for actors" and ask the question: "Why don't Jews eat pork?" The overall response of these myths, she claims, is that Jewish children were transformed into pigs, and the Jews cannot eat themselves. "Thus we had a *Christian* discourse on the pig." Voila!

"The Christian Discourse on the Pig," would indeed be a more suitable subtitle for *The Singular Beast* than "Jews, Christians, and the Pig." For the Jews, though present throughout the text, are invariably (like the pigs) part of someone else's discourse; squealing when they are slaughtered, but possessing no meaningful voice of their own. Although her discussion of the perceived similarities between humans and pigs takes her as far as *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, Fabre-Vassas seems to be unaware that the ancient rabbis of the Talmud had also seen a similarity between the two groups: "Rabbi Judah was once informed that a plague broke out among the swine and he ordered a public fast." Are we to say,

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

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asked the Talmud, that Rabbi Judah was of the opinion that an epidemic which breaks out among one kind of living beings is liable to spread among others? "No," it replied, "it is different in the case of swine, because their intestines are similar to those of human beings."

As Fabre-Vassas notes, the alleged similarity between pigs and humans was applied in Christian Europe, centuries later, to other organs as well. In 1490, the Francos, a family of *conversos* in La Guardia, were accused of having kidnapped and killed Cristobal (the Nino), a three-year-old Christian child. Towards the middle of the sixteenth century Damian de Vegas of Toledo composed a chronicle of the affair, in which he claimed that the Francos, before settling in La Guardia, had fled Spain's Inquisition and settled in France:

> There lived a knight who was poor and burdened with children; the Jews offered him money if he would accept the murder of one of his sons, giving them the victim's heart. He refused, but his wife, who was shrewder, arranged to take the Jews' money and keep her child. On her advice the knight killed a pig and supplied the Jews with the heart of the pig in place of the heart of the child. A diabolical old woman sold them a host, and they made a mixture with the heart, which they threw in the river, and the Christians would nearly all have been poisoned [by its water] had the knight not revealed the mystery. The said Jews then passed into Spain with Christians and settled in Guardia.

Early in our own century the Spanish historian Rafael Sabatini devoted a chapter of his famous study, *Torquemada and the Spanish Inquisition*, to the "affair of the Santo Nino," in which he acknowledged that "we are justified in rejecting the theory that the crucifixion of the Holy Child of La Guardia is to be accepted as an instance of Jewish ritual murder." Yet he felt the need to add, somewhat chillingly, that "we cannot say . . . that no such crime was ever committed."

The highly permeable frontier between Spain and southern France, across which passed some of the most explosive Jewish ideas and intellectual trends of the high middle ages, was also the site of some interesting Jewish thinking about the pig. Commenting, in late thirteenth-century Perpignan, on the Talmudic passage which cites the tradition about fasting when swine are afflicted by epidemic, Menahem Ha-Meiri cited an allegedly rabbinic etymology for the Hebrew word for pig: "Why is it called *hazir*? Because in the future God is destined to return it (*le-hahziro*) to us." This rather antinomian derivation (which does not, in fact, occur in classic rabbinic literature) first appeared somewhat earlier in the thirteenth century, in the kabbalistically-tinged Torah commentary of Bahya ben Asher, and then in the Talmud commentary of Yom Tov Ishbili, both of whom had resided in Saragossa. From northern Spain this medieval midrash quickly spread to the Jewish scholars of Languedoc: not only to Ha-Meiri in Perpignan, but also to Abba Mari (Astruc) of Lunel, his adversary in the bitter controversy over rationalism that raged in southern Europe in the early fourteenth century.

A century later, in his work on the principles of Judaism (completed in 1425), the Spanish-Jewish philosopher Joseph Albo acknowledged that "there is nothing . . . to prevent us from supposing that the divine law may in the future permit some things which are forbidden now, like [proscribed] fat or blood." He did not mention pork, though he was certainly familiar with the etymological midrash concerning its future permissibility which had been launched in his own country a century and a half earlier. Yet Albo had been among the rabbis present at the painfully protracted disputation of Tortosa in 1413-14, at which the apostate Geronimo de Santa Fe (formerly Joshua Lorki) argued that his former coreligionists had good reason, from their own sources, to accept Jesus as the Messiah. Among the sources that he cited concerning the temporality of the Torah's commandments was the allegedly rabbinic midrash based on the Hebrew word for pig: *vobis verbum in quo dicitur: Propter quid porcus vocetur hazir? quia Deus eum debet restituere ad Israel* (your expression in which it is stated: Why is the pig called *hazir*? Because God will restore it to Israel). When the Jewish disputants replied (perhaps disingenuously) that they were completely unaware of such a passage, Geronimo, asserting that it was widely known among the Jews, challenged them to accept total defeat if within eight days he located it in their Talmud. Obviously he did not; but Albo, writing a decade later, was not especially interested in lending credence to the claim made in Tortosa by his former opponent.

Writing in Naples late in the fifteenth century, however, two years after his expulsion from Spain, Isaac Abravanel was less reticent about citing the etymological midrash concerning the pig's future "return" to Israel. He suggested two possible replies to those who saw the midrash as evidence for rabbinic antinomianism: that the pig (as was noted by Rashi) is a metaphor for Esau, whose descendants will one day return to Israel, and also "another explanation ... that

Cantus

What it offers and what it withholds are the same: the refined inheritance of neglected towns. Steel girders frame the welding shop to an exoskeleton around the rest of the day. Wires coiled in nooses and spliced intestines, forklifts droning an oratorio to the gravel, sintered metal surging on pulleys and gears: this is the sound of bones on their way through the aircage. The hillside is piled in a scaffold of tires, the iconography of an orange and indigo lapse. Don't bother counting what changes more slowly than you do. Pick up what's dropped, index the rate of collapse. Oil rig, gasworks, glass plant, paper mill: listed, and turned away from, and a light going on in the neighborhood, where nobody does anything and everyone complains that nothing gets done.

Sanctus

Daylight savings, and all the art schools are closed. Somewhere in the wind corridor the pianos are beginning, and a rain suggests staccato out on the beaches. Tell yourself that suffering is what was born on the seventh day, that silence only enters when the motions of the body fall away. The clouds are no good to you now: exit the station while morning dismantles its promise. Conduct yourself by the hidden heuristics of alpha and endgame, ask for forgiveness when distance compels you to travel. And evening arrives ahead of the tide, as if an angel were dragging behind her the winter of where she had come from, and why.

ANDREW ZAWACKI

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God might permit it to Israel during wartime ... as it was permitted to them during the time of the conquest of the Land [of Israel]." Both replies were a far cry from the timidity or the hopelessness that we might expect from an Iberian exile in the wake of the expulsion. The first suggested that the Christians would one day return to Judaism; the second, that the Jews would return one day to the battlefield, where they too would feast on bacon.

In 1469, when Abravanel was still in his native Portugal, a New Christian of Spanish origin was accused of having recited the following prayer: "Blessed art Thou, O Lord, that Thou didst not make me a pig, so that the Christian would devour me." In his important study of the Inquisition in Ciudad Real, Haim Beinart cited this as an example of the "slanderous remarks about Christianity and the Church" of which the Conversos were "falsely accused," but I see no reason to assume that this—and similar accusations of what might be called "verbal resistance"—was false. As Fabre-Vassas notes, and as Beinart certainly knew, the word *Marrano*, by which the New Christians were pejoratively known, meant "pig." Is it so surprising, then, for a crypto-Jew to thank God for not having made him a pig?

European Jews, we have seen, could be simultaneously attracted and repelled by the pig, just as many were both attracted and repelled by the cross. And the story of this inflamed iconography is not yet over. As I was reading *The Singular Beast*, a number of Soviet-born Jews living in Israel, most notably Tatiana Susskin and Avigdor Eskin, have been acting out their ambivalence toward the animal that they no longer consume by enlisting it into their deranged war against the Arabs. Susskin has been jailed for preparing posters of Mohammed with a pig's head for distribution in Hebron, and Eskin has been indicted for placing a pig's head on the grave of the slain Palestinian guerrilla Izz al-Din Qassem. Fortunately he and his accomplice were stopped by the police before carrying out their next plan: to catapult a pig's head, with a Koran in its mouth, onto the Temple Mount, where the Al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock stand, on the last Friday of Ramadan. The recent history of the state of Israel shows that the Law of Return applies to the pig as well, although this is not quite the return predicted by the medieval rabbis.

ELLIOTT HOROWITZ, a fellow at the Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies, is completing a book on Purim violence.

TRB *continued from page 6*

presidential nominee and any softening of the platform's opposition to abortion even if that meant disobeying the candidate.

As it happened, of course, Dole did not choose a pro-choice running mate, and party activists wrote the platform. But, having ceded control of the platform, Dole promptly boasted that he had not even read it. And that humiliation convinced the religious right that platforms were worthless absent some mechanism for their enforcement—which set the stage for the Lambert resolution.

Since Lambert, the reassertion of party authority has taken two broad forms. The first is an effort to abolish primaries. In California, Alaska, and Virginia, party leaders have battled to eliminate open primaries—which allow voting across party lines—and suggested reestablishing caucuses or conventions instead. In Texas, where many judges are elected, the party chairman has proposed nominating them at the state convention rather than through primary elections.

The second vehicle to reassert party authority is the enforcement of platforms. The Lambert resolution cuts off funding only to candidates who disagree with the party on partial-birth abortion. But, in California, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Texas, state parties have entertained proposals to disavow candidates who violate the principles of the platform more broadly. In Texas last year, the Republican Party censured one state senator for offenses ranging from opposing parental notification on abortion to supporting the decriminalization of sodomy.

The irony of these efforts is that, while their motivation may be purely instrumental, they raise fundamental questions about political participation and organization. Which is more democratic—a decision made by a large number of people who check a ballot, or a decision by a smaller number who deliberate all night at a party caucus? Do parties exist to win elections, in which case they should seek the broadest possible membership, or do they exist to advance clear principles, in which case they should exclude some for the sake of ideological coherence?

Considering the low level of knowledge, involvement, and party allegiance that characterizes our politics, Americans have no right to feel self-satisfied about the way we have answered those questions over the past few decades. By raising them anew, the Christian right has done American democracy a favor—whether it intended to or not.

PETER BEINART

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

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WASHINGTON DIARIST

Twister

IN APRIL, TWO PEOPLE, ONE IN Northern Ireland and one in Alabama, professed a familiarity with the devil. In Northern Ireland, the Rev. Paul Symonds, a Catholic priest, admitted that the new peace agreement might falter because, "Where the spirit of God is at work, the spirit of evil will try to destroy. Satan is still at work in the hearts of some people." Meanwhile, in Alabama, Rick Cooper, a pastor in Tuscaloosa, surveyed the spoliation wrought by a powerful tornado: houses razed, several killed. He told his congregation that their survival was an act of God: "We're not here because we're better.... We're here because he's great. God poured out his grace on us Wednesday night, his kindness and his goodness. When people look around and said, 'Well, is God responsible for this?'—by no means, by no means."

BOTH RESPONSES OFFER AWKWARD and moving testimony to the unpliability of the ancient question: Why does God permit evil and suffering to exist? Both men could hardly avoid falling into the illogicalities and near-heresies that are inherent in what is called theodicy, or the justification of God's relation to human and natural evil. Thus the Rev. Symonds posits a Satan, a force of evil apparently equivalent to God's force of good. And Pastor Cooper verges on the same explanation. After all, if, as Pastor Cooper suggests, God has saved the worshipers of his church, then either God must have decided to abandon those who died when the twister came through, or God simply could not do battle with the superior force of the twister.

THOUGH NEITHER COOPER NOR Symonds would admit it, this is close to Manicheanism, named after a third century heretical sect that believed that the force of good is opposed by a force of evil that good cannot control but can merely fight. This idea of two rival principles—God, as it were, resembling a decent but somewhat ineffectual firefighter—predates Christianity and perhaps has its roots in Egyptian paganism. Plato essentially believed in the two principles, as did Zoroaster, Plutarch, and (more complicatedly) the Gnostics.

ALL THESE PEOPLE WERE STRUGgling, like the Reverends Symonds and Cooper, with the question of why we suffer. The existence of pain and suffering seems either to limit God's power or to qualify his goodness. Either he cannot control this evil (and then he is not all-powerful), or, in some way, he wants it to exist (and then he is not good). David Hume puts it tartly in his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*: "Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?"

I WAS RAISED IN A FORMIDABLY Christian household. An antique evangelical language (more Matthew Arnold than Billy Graham) sternly governed my childhood: activities were "edifying" or "worthy" (or their opposites). A breach was perhaps inevitable. When it came, at the age of 15 or so, it arose out of the problem of God and evil. Though doubtless philosophically naïve, I could find no satisfactory answer to David Hume's negative algebra: it all added up to nothing, to no God. Even then, I could see that Manicheanism was only plausible at the cost of so reducing God's status that "belief" in him would be meaningless.

BUT, IF WE CANNOT BE MANICHEans, and posit a satanic force at work, then how do we explain a fatal tornado, or fatal terrorists in Northern Ireland? Theology has few responses. The most enduring is that God's ways are incomprehensible. This is Job's lesson. To any thinking person, this answer is an affront and also smacks of a certain pagan stoicism. Another is that we will be rewarded in heaven for our suffering on earth. But most people find this idea unacceptable, if not repulsive, because it is not clear why happiness must be only approached belatedly by the path of suffering rather than tasted originally.

THE MOST SOPHISTICATED DEfense of God's relation to evil is that a world in which we could do no harm to one another would have to be a world without free will and that this would be intolerable. For us to act as moral agents at all, we must have the choice to act immorally. A mindless utopia watched over by an absolutely controlling God would be a repulsive and pointless world. Thus God awarded us free will, knowing that we might misuse it as a very necessity of human life.

AUGUSTINE ABANDONED MANIcheanism for the free will argument and developed it into the most powerful of theodicy's weapons. But it crumbles as soon as you squeeze it. First, as the seventeenth-century skeptic Pierre Bayle has put it, why would God bestow a gift that he knows in advance will be abused in such a manner that it will only serve to bring about the ruin of the person to whom it is given? Bayle is very penetrating, but one can go further. All free will arguments rest on the assumption that free will is the greatest good we can possibly have. The best example of this assumption is to be seen in the work of Richard Swinburne, an especially monstrous theologian at Oxford, who argues that physical pain exists to offer the sufferer the great good of choice—"Whether to endure it with patience, or to bemoan his lot."

ALL FREE WILL arguments posit that a world without free will would be a more awful place than the world as we know it, which is merely full of pain. But how can we possibly know this? Suppose that for all of recorded history humans had never known pain or evil, that we had always lived in precisely the utopian prison that the free will arguers fear. If we had only ever lived in such a place, would it seem pointless and colorless to us? Naturally, we would not experience it as such because we would never have known its opposite (a world full of pain, suffering, and free will). Likewise, if no human being had ever been born with hands, we would all have very developed legs, and we could not miss something we had never had. God, presumably, *could* have created such a world, and it would be the ideal laboratory to observe Jesus's first two commandments: "Love thy God, and love thy neighbor." In other words, free will is clearly important for humans, but why is it important for God?

SO, IF WE ARE NOT MANICHEANS, then we have few available responses to the Alabama tornado or to Ulster terrorism: Either God omnipotently presides over these happenings in some way, or there is no God. But if God omnipotently presides over them, then he presides over our suffering. He watches us drown in our own incomprehension. I'm afraid that I must choose the latter explanation, even if it is not very "edifying."

JAMES WOOD

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
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